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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) is critical in the proper functioning of South 
Africa’s criminal justice system and upholding of the rule of law. And for it to play this 
critical role it must be independent from any external influence and manipulation and 
carry out its functions without fear, favour and prejudice. Once it allows external 
interference in its prosecutorial function it runs the risk of functioning with fear and 
favour of powerful forces in the society, thereby losing its independence. This may 
result in loss of trust in and support by the public of the rule of law. 
 
However, in recent history the NPA has taken decisions that raise questions about 
its independence. These questionable decisions involve high profile politicians and 
government officials who are, allegedly, involved in illegal and corrupt activities and 
practices, but are either not prosecuted, or credible cases against them are being 
suspiciously withdrawn. This state of affairs has caused uncomfortable allegations 
and counter allegations, all of which question the independence of the NPA, and 
these can no longer be ignored. State institutions, especially the security cluster, are 
allegedly heavily involved and the judiciary is threatened overtly when certain 
decisions go against some politicians. 
 
 
The study, therefore, is designed to investigate the extent to which the alleged 
interferences impact negatively with the administration of justice. It then assesses 
and evaluates the constitutional and legislative safeguards guaranteeing the 
independence of the NPA in order to determine if they are adequate enough to 
prevent the NPA from external executive and political interference in its prosecutorial 
decision-making function. To achieve this, the charging, prosecution and dropping of 
charges against Jacob Zuma, on various counts of corruption and other related 
matters will, inter alia, be the primary focus of the study. The study comes up with 
set of recommendations aimed at strengthening the integrity of the NPA, in 
particular, and  the criminal justice system in general. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1. Background to the study 
In very general terms, corruption is ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.’ In 
a narrower sense, it is defined as ‘dishonest or fraudulent conduct and abuse of 
power by those acting within the public sphere for self-benefit or for the benefit of 
others.’1 Corruption is a global phenomenon that affects states, governments, 
businesses, organised civil society and the public at large. However, its effects are 
most damaging in the developing world.2 In African states, corruption is one of the 
three top national problems, besides poverty and unemployment, which undermine 
economic development.3 According to estimates of the African Union (AU), African 
economies lose more than US$ 148 billion dollars a year as a result of corruption. 
This amount represents roughly 25 per cent of the continent’s GDP.4 In its judgment 
in the matter of Hugh Glenister and the President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others, the Constitutional Court (CC) stated as follows:  
 
                                                          
1 Art 1 of the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, Sec 3 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt  
  Activities Act.   
2 See Hugh Glenister v the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 48/10) [2011]  
   ZACC 6 (17 March 2011) paras 124 and 167 (hereafter Glenister). 
3 J P Gashumba  Anti-corruption agencies in Africa: a comparative analysis of Rwanda, Sierra Leone          
  and Malawi (unpublished LLM research paper, University of the Western Cape, 2010) 2. 
4 M Khemani Anti-Corruption Commissions in the African State: Burying the Problem or Addressing  
  the Issue? (unpublished LLM thesis, Georgetown University Law Centre, 2009) 2. 
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There can be no gainsaying that corruption threatens to fell at the knees virtually 
everything we hold dear and precious in our hard-won constitutional order.  It 
blatantly undermines the democratic ethos, the institutions of democracy, the rule of 
law and the foundational values of our nascent constitutional project.  It fuels 
maladministration and public fraudulence and imperils the capacity of the state to 
fulfil its obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfil all the rights enshrined in 
the Bill of Rights.  When corruption and organised crime flourish, sustainable 
development and economic growth are stunted.  And in turn, the stability and 
security of society is put at risk.5 
 
In recent years there has been a trend amongst African governments to establish 
anti-corruption commissions for purposes of combating corruption. These state-
funded anti-corruption commissions or agencies are the result of the increased 
world-wide attention being paid to corruption in the wake of the adoption of 
international and regional instruments such as the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC) and the African Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption.6 
 
South Africa, as a relatively new democracy and one of the fast developing countries 
in the continent, grapples constantly with high levels of perceived and actual 
corruption within both the public and the private spheres. In 1992, parliament 
enacted a comprehensive law against corruption, namely, the Corruption Act 94 of 
1992, which replaced the common-law crime of bribery and the statutory types of 
                                                          
5 Glenister para 166. 
6 See Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa (2015) 32 (hereafter IFF). 
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corruption which were criminalised by earlier enactments. The Corruption Act of 
1992 contained only a single, broad crime of corruption. However, in 2004 
Parliament enacted the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 
2004 which replaced the broad definition of corruption with the general crime of 
corruption, complemented by various specific forms of corruption. 
 
Anti-corruption laws and regulations make sense only if they are implemented in 
practice. It is, therefore, incumbent on the investigating and prosecution authorities, 
namely, the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA), respectively, to ensure that corrupt individuals are brought to book. 
The prosecution service, in particular, needs to perform its work without political 
interference. For this reason, the South African Constitution provides unequivocally 
for the creation of an adequately independent National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). 
The Constitution empowers the prosecuting authority ‘to institute criminal 
proceedings on behalf of the state, and to carry out any necessary functions 
incidental to instituting criminal proceedings.’7 The National Prosecution Authority 
Act8 (NPA Act), which gives effect to this provision, further provides in section 32 that 
the NPA must exercise its functions impartially, in good faith and without fear, favour 
or prejudice, subject only to the Constitution and the law.9 In practice, the phrase 
‘without fear, favour or prejudice means that the NPA must show no favours, not only 
to the weak and the powerless in the society, but also, and importantly, to the mighty 
and powerful in government. 
                                                          
7 Sec 179(2) of the Constitution. 
8 National Prosecution Authority Act No.38 of 1998 (hereafter NPA Act). 
9 Sec 32(1)(a) of the NPA Act. 
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To safeguard the independence of the prosecution service, the National Prosecution 
Authority Act (NPAA) states categorically that ‘no organ of state and no member or 
employee of an organ of state nor any other person shall improperly interfere with, 
hinder or obstruct the prosecuting authority or any member thereof in the exercise, 
carrying out or performance of its, his or her powers, duties and functions.’10 Instead, 
the Constitution, the supreme law of South Africa, obliges organs of state to assist 
and protect the NPA by way of legislation and other measures to ensure its 
independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness.11 Since 1994, 
when South Africa became a democracy, the NPA has instituted several criminal 
prosecutions against prominent political figures and state officials, the most 
prominent being Jackie Selebi, the then incumbent Commissioner of Police and 
president of the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL), who was 
subsequently convicted and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for corruption. The 
NPA has prosecuted prominent political luminaries also, including Toni Yengeni, the 
then Chief Whip of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) in parliament, Winnie 
Mandela, ex-wife of the then President Nelson Mandela, and Allan Boesak. The 
present, incumbent president Jacob Zuma, too, was prosecuted but acquitted on 
rape charges in 2005 before he became president of the country.  
 
However, since 2008, when the former head of the NPA, Vusi Pikoli, was sacked 
from his position as National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), questions have 
been raised publicly as to the genuine independence of the NPA from political 
meddling. Mistrust has grown since then, particularly in the light of the rapid 
                                                          
10 Sec 32(1)(b) of the NPA Act.  
11 Sec 179(4) of the Constitution. 
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succession of heads of the NPA and the high turn-over of key personnel within the 
prosecution service. Since the prosecutorial function is so critical to the effective 
workings of the criminal justice system and for upholding the rule of law, any doubt 
concerning ability of the prosecution service to discharge its constitutional obligations 
in accordance with the law, affects the entire image of the administration of justice in 
the eye of the public. Prosecutors are, therefore, called ‘gate keepers’12 of the 
criminal justice system, without which judicial sanctions cannot occur.  In S v 
Yengeni, the Court stated that: 
`[t]he independence of the judiciary is directly related to, and depends upon, the 
independence of the legal professions and of the NDPP. Undermining the freedom from 
outside influence would lead the entire legal process, including the functioning of the 
judiciary, being held hostage to those interests that might be threatened by a fearless, 
committed and independent search for the truth.’13 
 
It is therefore evident that the prosecution service has a crucial role to fulfil in the 
administration of criminal justice. The discretionary powers enjoyed by public 
prosecutors are considerable. In fact, it is said that no other official in the 
administration of justice exercises more influence over the liberty of the individual 
                                                          
12 The prosecution service is referred to as a gate keeper because its decisions have an enormous  
    impact on everyone experiencing the criminal justice system, whether victims, witnesses or  
    accused. Prosecutors determine what happens to the work of the police, and of other investigative    
    agencies, and they influence also the workload of the courts. Their decisions also have an effect    
    on  the workload and size of the prison population and also impact See House of Commons  
    Justice  Committee, Ninth Report of Session published on 6 August 2009 by authority of the House   
    of  Commons London (The Stationery Office Limited, 2009) 5 (hereafter House of Commons   
    Justice Committee). 
13 State v Yengeni 2006 (1) SACR 405 paras 52 - 53. 
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than the public prosecutor.14 It is the prosecutor  who decides whether or not to 
institute a prosecution, which charges to bring forward and which to dismiss, whom 
to charge, what evidence to present, which witnesses to call, and whether or not to 
enter into a plea bargain.  These powers derive from the doctrine of separation of 
powers, and in South Africa, as in other common law jurisdictions, courts are 
reluctant, in practice, to interfere with prosecutorial discretion. 
 
However, given the suspicion that in South Africa there is political meddling in the 
discretionary powers of prosecutors, it is necessary to enquire into the legal 
framework that regulates the role and function of the prosecution in the 
administration of criminal justice. This partly explains the rationale for this study, but 
a more comprehensive rationale is set out below. 
 
2. Rationale 
 
The transformation of the criminal justice system was amongst the foremost points 
on the reform agenda of the new democratic government under Mandela when it 
assumed office in 1994. The new government was under no illusion that unless the 
criminal justice system was made transparent and accountable, democratic 
institutions would lose their credibility fast. This realisation stemmed from the fact 
that it was the criminal justice system in particular which had been used by the 
apartheid regime to enforce its obnoxious racially discriminatory policies. The cutting 
edge of the criminal justice system was no doubt the prosecution service, for it was 
the public prosecutors who hauled the violators of the apartheid laws before the 
                                                          
14 See House of Commons Justice Committee 5. See also V E Beety ‘Pivoting Accountability in the 
    Criminal Justice System’ (2015) 80 Missouri Law Review 1 at 18. 
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courts. Prosecutors paid scarce attention to the fact that confessions were at times 
elicited through torture, and the courts, too, tended not to exclude evidence obtained 
through torture.15 
 
There was to be no room for such abuses in a democratic South Africa which is 
based on a constitution with a bill of rights and founded upon the rule of law. The 
need to cultivate a culture of human rights necessarily entailed setting up a criminal 
justice system in which the quality of justice dispensed enjoys public confidence and 
is consistent with human rights norms. This meant making the prosecutorial 
decision-making process transparent and placing the prosecution beyond the sphere 
of .political influence.  The arrangement in most commonwealth jurisdictions, 
according to which the head of the country’s prosecution service, the Attorney-
General (AG), is either a Member of Parliament or a member of Cabinet, did not lend 
itself as a useful example for a democratic South Africa, for practice has shown that 
even if ‘the Attorney-General is expected to take his prosecutorial decisions without 
interference and control, …the public often suspects that the practice seldom 
accords with principle.’16 The pre-democratic South African practices as well, 
according to which the Attorney-General was accountable to the Minister of Justice, 
had shown itself to be vulnerable to political abuse.17  As a result of these 
                                                          
15 See Mthembu v S (64/20070 [2008] ZASCA 51 para 22. 
16  O Ayoola ‘The Decision to Prosecute’ (1991) 17 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1032 at 1036. 
17  See Sec 45(3) of the General Law Amendment Act 46 of 1957 which empowered the Minister of   
    Justice to reverse decisions taken by an Attorney-General. See also B Van Niekerk and E  
    Mathews ‘Eulogising the Attorney-General – A qualified dissent’ 89 (1972) SALJ 292; J van der    
    Westhuizen ‘A few reflections on the role of courts, government, the legal profession, universities,    
    the media and civil society in a constitutional democracy’ (2008) 8 African Human Rights Law   
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considerations, the Constitution has come up with an alternative structure, which is 
uniquely South African. Section 108 provides for the establishment of an NPA, which 
is directed by the NDPP, who must exercise the prosecutorial function without fear, 
favour or prejudice, and that ‘[t]he cabinet member responsible for the administration 
of justice must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting authority.’18 This 
wording constitutes the bare skeleton that defines the relationship between the 
NPA/NDPP and the Executive. 
 
3. Research question 
 
The primary question that the study seeks to answer is how sufficient (or insufficient) 
are the constitutional and legislative safeguards that guarantee and protect the 
independence of the NPA against any interference.  
 
4.  Limitations of the study 
 
This study covers the period from the early 2000s, when Jacob Zuma, the incumbent 
president of South Africa at the time of writing, was first investigated by the NPA until 
July 2015. The period under discussion covers the time when the charges against 
Zuma were dropped in 2009 and extends through the period during which the 
Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) was disbanded in 2010 and replaced by the 
Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI). The discussion will include the 
dismissal of Vusi Pikoli as NDPP and subsequent developments, up till the time of 
the appointment of Mxolisi Nxasane as the NDPP.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    Journal 25 at 252-253. 
18 Sec 108 of the Constitution,  
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5.  Research methodology 
Given the nature of the research question, the study will proceed by way of an 
analysis of the circumstances that prompted the NDPP to make certain decisions in 
cases involving high-profile persons, as these are the decisions that have attracted 
widespread public attention and controversy. As there are no academic studies 
relating to the controversial events around the NPA since 2007, the study will rely on 
the facts and judgments in court cases and in media reports, including analyses and 
commentaries by scholars and political analysts that have been published in the 
newspapers and other public fora. Even though this is not a comparative study, the 
study will refer, in passing, to how prosecutorial discretion is exercised under the 
inquisitorial criminal justice systems, especially in Germany, where the principle of 
mandatory prosecution applies. However, as South Africa has an adversarial system 
of criminal justice, reference will be made to the powers pertaining to the 
prosecutorial function in other common law jurisdictions, namely, Botswana, the 
United States and the United Kingdom as well. In addition, the width of prosecutorial 
discretion which South African prosecutors can exercise will be evaluated against 
the standard enunciated in the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors and other 
international and regional guidelines.  
 
The purpose of assessing the regulation of the prosecutorial function in other 
jurisdictions is to ascertain the extent to which prosecutors, and by implication, the 
national head of the prosecution service is answerable to the Executive; or put 
otherwise, the boundaries of prosecutorial discretion. However, the author  
appreciates that whatever new insights are gained from an enquiry into other legal 
systems cannot be transplanted to South Africa, given that arrangements in foreign 
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countries is dictated by their respective political and legal cultures and by their 
national constitutions and domestic laws. The comparative study will serve therefore 
merely as rough guide for whatever reform could be contemplated for South Africa. 
 
6.  Literature survey 
There is hardly any literature on the prosecution service in South Africa. This is partly 
due to the fact that public prosecutors were recognised as a professional group only 
in 1979.19  Before then, public prosecutors were a marginalised group, relegated to 
occupy the status of Cinderella of the legal profession.20 As a result, the office of the 
Attorney-General, the former provincial head of the prosecution service, attracted 
scant academic attention, It was not until South Africa began its transition to 
democracy that the prosecution service came under closer academic scrutiny, 
mainly because the law provided for one single prosecution service, unified under 
one national prosecuting authority. The first, most searching survey of the 
prosecution service was a monograph by Martin Schönteich, entitled Lawyers for the 
People: The South African Prosecution Service, which traces the history of the 
prosecution service from colonial times until the late 1990s, following the newly-
established NPA.21 Schőnteich’s study is enlightening for the fact that it discusses in 
great detail the problems besetting the day-to-day work of public prosecutors and 
which hamper them from performing optimally. The study contains useful and 
practicable suggestions on how to improve the effectiveness of prosecutors. 
However, as the monograph appeared at a time when the NPA had just begun to 
                                                          
19 Report of the Department of Justice 1 July 1979-30 June 1980 at 6. 
20 J H Hugo ‘The Prosecutor: Cinderella in a Black Gown’ (1971) 12 Codicillus 25 at 27-28. 
21 Monograph 53 (Institute of Security Studies 2001 (unpaginated).  
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take shape under the first NDPP, it discusses none of the issues that cropped up 
only subsequently and which are the focus of this study.  
 
Van Zyl Smit and Steyn’s article on the new prosecuting authority in South Africa, 
which was published in 2000, sets out the structure of the NPA and defines its 
relationship to the Minister, warning about the potential vulnerability of the NPA to 
political manipulation. The authors suggested that the new dispensation left the 
NDPP more open to political interference than the provincial Attorneys-General in 
the days of the Union, before the Minister of Justice assumed ultimate responsibility 
for the prosecution service in 1926.22  
 
Sarkin and Cowen critiqued the present NPA structure when it was still in the form of 
a Bill, before the NPA Act was passed. They argued, too, that political interference in 
the work of the NPA must be restricted, but that the NDPP not be given 
untrammelled powers and that ‘checks and balances offered by mechanisms of 
accountability should be built into the system.’23  
 
Writing in 1995, Bekker, on the other hand, in an article titled ‘National or Super 
Attorney-General: Political Subjectivity or Juridical Objectivity?’ went to the other 
extreme, advocating that the then proposed NDPP be totally independent of any 
                                                          
22 D Van Zyl Smit and E Steyn ‘Prosecuting authority in the new South Africa’ (200) 8 CILJ 137-155. 
23 J  Sarkin and S Cowen ‘The Draft National Prosecuting Authority Bill 1997: A critique’ (1997) 
SAJCJ 64 at 74. 
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political authority, pledging allegiance only to the Constitution and not be ‘subject to 
the caprices of a politician….’24  
 
Fernandez’s article titled `The National Director of Public Prosecutions in South 
Africa: Independent Boss or Party Politician?’  which was published in 2007 dealt 
with the theme of this study, but at a time when the alleged political interference in 
the decision-making of the NDPP was just beginning to be reported on in the media? 
The article pointed to the fact that the controversial prosecutorial decision-making in 
relation to the corruption charges against Zuma had begun to show worrying signs 
that the NPA was, after all, not as independent as the law promised. The article 
suggested that law governing the appointment of the NDPP be amended to provide 
for a more transparent appointment procedure.25 Redpath’s monograph Failing to 
Prosecute? published in 2012, refers to how the successive NDPPs have ‘been 
integrally involved in political events, often creating the perception of a compromised 
independence.’26 Redpath contends that the strongest factor affecting the credibility 
and effectiveness of the NPA ‘is the inappropriate exercise of the discretion not to 
prosecute’ in politically sensitive matters and on weak grounds – a state of affairs 
that has the effect of casting doubt on the independence of the NPA.27 She 
recommends that the prosecution policy be revised and that clear criteria be 
                                                          
24   P M Bekker ‘National or Super Attorney-General; Political Subjectivity or Juridical Objectivity’  
(1995) 8 Consultus 27 at 30. 
25   L Fernandez ‘The National director of Public Prosecutions in South Africa: Independent Boss or    
     Party Politician?’ (2007) 1 Speculum Juris 129 at 145. 
26  J Redpath Failing to Prosecute? Assessing the state of the National Prosecuting Authority in 
South Africa Monograph No 186 (ISS 2012) at 19. 
27  Redpath (2012) at 19 and 55. 
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delineated which determine when the discretion not to prosecute should be 
exercised.  In 2014 Schönteich went a step further by suggesting that the NPA be 
made more accountable to the public through the establishment of oversight bodies, 
such as an Inspectorate or a complaints directorate, or even a kind of review body 
through which the public can scrutinise the decisions made by the NPA.28 
 
What is striking about the few writings surveyed above is that they have been 
authored by only a handful of South African scholars who have visited the topic of 
the NPA repeatedly and the thrust of whose writings has tended to revolve around 
the issue of the independence, or lack of it, of the NPA from political meddling.  
However, the authors mentioned avoid engaging with specific situations; their 
arguments are expressed more generally. However, in an article published in 2009, 
a Canadian academic, Stenning, looks at how the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in favour of not prosecuting a high-profile, politically sensitive case is 
overridden by extraneous factors such as ‘national security’ and ‘public interest.’ 
However, what constitutes national security or public interest is a matter for the 
government to decide.29 Stenning comes to the conclusion that, contrary to accepted 
wisdom, laws designed to insulate prosecutorial discretion from political interference 
promise more than they can fulfil, for they do not provide neat solutions to all cases. 
He cites the two South African cases of Selebi and Zuma to substantiate his 
contention. 
                                                          
28 M Schönteich Strengthening Prosecutorial Accountability in South Africa ISS Paper 255 (ISS 
2014) at 19.  
29 P C Stenning ‘Discretion, Politics, and the Public Interest in “High-Profile” Criminal investigations 
and Prosecutions’ (2009) 24 Can JL & Soc 337-366. 
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While Stenning’s article covers some of the points canvassed in this thesis, it is 
somewhat dated, for the NPA has experienced considerable convulsions and 
fluctuations since 2009, especially with regard to the position of NDPP and court 
actions pertaining to the incumbents of the office. The NPA has in the meantime also 
become a contentious subject of public debate and media scrutiny. This thesis 
engages with the issues raised by these developments and deliberates on the 
constitutional and jurisprudential considerations that weigh on the topic under 
discussion.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This introductory chapter has sought to give context to this study. It sketched the 
factual and legal background to the topic and delineated the issues that emerge and 
the question which the study will seek to answer. The next chapter studies the 
evolution of the prosecution service in South Africa from the colonial era to the 
advent of democracy. The history is important, for it informs us of the role the 
prosecution service played in the political history of the country and the reason why 
the prosecution service is so critical to the development of the rule of law and a 
culture of human rights.  
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                                                    CHAPTER 2 
The History of the Prosecution Service in South Africa from 1652 to 1992  
1.  Introduction 
This chapter deals with the way in which the office of the prosecutor evolved from 
the colonial era during Dutch rule in the 17th and 18th Centuries and under British rule 
from the early 19th Century until Union in 1910 and from then until 1992. The 
terminology used for ‘prosecutor’ and ‘Attorney-General’ in this chapter is not 
consistent, for the Dutch brought with them the continental European nomenclature 
and the British used the appellation used in England, hence the interchangeable 
designation or labels given to the same officer. 
 
2.  Dutch rule (1652-1794) 
 
The struggle for the independence of the prosecution services from the executive 
could be traced back to the Dutch colonial rule of the Cape, starting in the mid-17th   
century. In 1652, when the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) occupied the Cape, 
the office or position of the fiscal (Dutch: fiskaal, meaning a shrike) was established. 
The fiscal was responsible for conducting prosecutions, as well as investigating 
crimes and punishing civil servants who were corrupt or neglected to perform their 
duties.1 In 1688, the fiscal received the title of Fiscal Independent and was made 
directly accountable to the Council of Seventeen, the directors of the DEIC.2  While 
                                                          
1 M Schönteich Lawyers for the People: The South African prosecution service (ISS Monograph       
  Series No 53 March 2001) 27.  
2 Schönteich (2001:27).  
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the fiscal sat on the Council of Policy, the political governing body, he did not have to 
account for his actions to the Council.  Not even the governor at the Cape could give 
him orders.3 In addition, he acted as public prosecutor in criminal trials, prevented 
smuggling, and was in charge of the police. In 1688 the Independent Fiscal was 
given vast powers to punish officials for dereliction of duty, including the right to 
report the Governor to the Council of Seventeen in Holland, with whom he 
corresponded directly.4 During this period, the Fiscal Independent functioned 
independently of the executive, meaning the Governor and the Council. 
 
In 1783 the Council of Seventeen created a new high court of justice at the Cape. 
The court, also called the Council of Justice (Raad van Justitie), had jurisdiction over 
criminal and civil cases. The fiscal prosecuted persons whose conduct harmed the 
interests of the DEIC. He also prosecuted other serious criminal cases, unless they 
originated in outlying districts, where a district official, the landdrost,5 arrested the 
                                                          
3 Schönteich (2001:28). 
4 Schönteich (2001:28). 
5 In 1957 the title of “Landdrost” was officially and legally recognised. In terms of  section 7 of the   
    General Law Amendment Act of 1957 (Recognition of official title of 'landdrost' and amendment of   
    certain laws), any reference in the Afrikaans or Dutch version of any law or document to the official  
    title- 
(a) of 'magistraat' or 'addisionele magistraat' or 'assistent-magistraat' shall be construed to 
include a reference to the official title of 'landdros' or 'addisionele landdros' or 'assistent-landdros' 
respectively; and 
(b) of 'landdros' or 'addisionele landdros' or 'assistent-landdros' shall be construed to include a 
reference to the official title of 'magistraat' or 'addisionele magistraat' or 'assistent-magistraat' 
respectively. See General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1957 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1957-068.pdf (accessed 5 June 2012). 
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suspects and arraigned them before the council, thereby acting as a prosecutor 
before the council.6  
 
The fiscal was paid a fixed salary, which ensured his independence. In addition, he 
had the right to claim a commission on all fines he imposed on offenders, a 
circumstance which motivated him to pursue all law breakers. When fines could not 
be paid, it was not uncommon for the fiscal to confiscate the property of 
transgressors of the law. Some fiscals were also entitled to tax agricultural produce 
that was delivered to foreign ships by the burgher community at the Cape.7 This 
rapidly led to an abuse of his position and the fiscal became a despised official 
among the early settlers at the Cape.8 As a result, the settlers named the fiscal the 
shrike (a butcher bird which is a small bird of prey with a strong hooked and toothed 
bill with the habit of impaling its prey of small birds and insects on thorns).9 This 
suggests that the reputation and professional integrity of the fiscal was potentially 
damaged and that the society’s respect, confidence and support for the criminal 
justice system in general and the prosecution services in particular, were fatally 
compromised. 
 
3.  British rule (1795 – 1802) 
 
In 1795 the British assumed control at the Cape. The administration of justice 
remained in the hands of the Council of Justice. The fees and additional earnings 
                                                          
6 Schönteich (2009:29). 
7 Schönteich (2001:29). 
8 Schönteich (2001:29). 
9 Schönteich (2001:29). 
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that previously formed a large and obscure part of many officials’ income were 
eliminated. But only the fiscal was still entitled to part of the fines imposed by the 
Supreme Court. However, the fiscal lost the independence he enjoyed before 1795, 
and his position was made subordinate to that of the Governor at the Cape.10 His 
role remained the same but was cut down to ensuring that the laws of the colony 
were carried out, that transgressors of the law were punished, and that he 
prosecuted criminal trials before the Council of Justice.11  
 
4.  The Batavian Republic (1803-1805) 
 
In 1803 the Batavian Republic (as the United Netherlands had become known) took 
possession of the Cape, giving it the status of a Dutch colony.12 Important changes 
were undertaken in the colony’s administration of justice. The judicial and executive 
authorities were separated. The judicial authority was entrusted to the Council of 
Justice, consisting of six members with legal qualifications, a secretary and an 
Attorneys-General who replaced the fiscal, and who was no longer entitled to benefit 
from the fines imposed as was the case under the previous Dutch rule. 13 
 
5.  Second British Occupation from 1806 onwards 
 
In 1806 when the British occupied the Cape for a second time, the new British 
governor at the Cape was granted extensive powers. All legislative and executive 
                                                          
10 G Botha ‘The Public Prosecutor of the Cape Colony up to 1828’ 1918 (SALJ) 400. 
11 Schönteich (2001:29). 
12 Schönteich (2001:29). 
13 H R Hahlo and  E Kahn The Union of South Africa: The Development of its Laws and Constitution   
 (London, Stevens 1960) 201. 
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powers were vested in him, and the Council of Policy was abolished. The judiciary 
was subordinate to him in that he could appoint and dismiss all members of the 
Council of Justice except its president, and all authority in both criminal and civil 
courts was vested in him. The office of the fiscal as crown prosecutor was 
reinstituted. The fiscal held a position in the Council of Justice and could claim a 
commission of one-third of all fines imposed.14   
 
The fiscal’s abuse of power prompted an investigation which resulted in the fiscal 
being replaced by an Attorneys-General. 15 The governor lost his judicial powers, 
making way for an independent judiciary. The Council of Justice was replaced by a 
High Court of Justice consisting of a chief justice and three judges, all appointed 
from Britain.  
 
6.  The Prosecution Service in the Boer Republics and after Union  
 
6.1 Boer republics 
 
In both the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State Republic the Attorneys-
General were at first independent officials, but were later made subject to their 
respective Executive Councils.16 In the Free State the change was necessitated 
because of widespread dissatisfaction with the implementation of prosecutorial 
                                                          
14 Schönteich (2001:29). 
15 See letter of Goderich to Bourke of 5 August 1827 in Theal 1827 (32) Records of the Cape Colony   
    266 at 268. 
16 Ordinance No 2 of 1867 Wetboek (1891); Volksraad Resolution of 18 February 1864, Art 20    
Volksraadnotule Staatscourant I March 1864. 
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policies.17 In the Transvaal Republic there was a high fluctuation of Attorneys-
General, presumably on account of the fact that they lacked security of tenure, 
despite the fact they performed numerous other administrative duties not connected 
with the prosecutorial function.18  In the English-speaking colony of Natal, Attorneys-
General were shouldered also with cumbersome executive functions, and they also 
ran private practices, which created considerable conflict of interests, much to the 
anger of citizens.19 
 
7. The prosecution service from 1910 to 1996 
 
From the end of the second Anglo-Boer war and 1910 each of the four provinces 
which later became the Union of South Africa had its own Attorneys-General who 
was a member of cabinet and who prosecuted in the name of the British Crown. With 
the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 prosecutorial authority was 
vested in the Attorneys-General of each of the four provinces.20 As elected members 
of the colonial cabinets they were directly accountable to the electorate, with the risk 
                                                          
17 Scholz Die Konstitusie en Staatsinstellings van die Oranje-Vrystaat 1854-1902 (NV Swets &  
    Zeitlinger, Amsterdam 1937)180.  
18 Hahlo and Kahn (1960:230). 
19 P Spiller The Natal Supreme Court; Its origins (1846-158) (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Natal 1982) 207-208. 
20 See Sec 139 of the South Africa Act and Sec 17 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 
1917.  The Solicitor-General of the Cape Eastern Districts and the Crown Prosecutor of Griqualand 
West retained their previous authority, but the office of the latter was abolished in 1912 and vested 
with the Attorneys-General for the Cape Province. See Sec 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 
of 1912. 
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that their decisions would be influenced by their desire to be re-elected.21 There was 
also concern about the far-reaching powers of Attorneys-General and their 
independence and freedom from political control.22 This resulted in the amendment 
of the law in 1926 which gave the minister of Justice final control of all prosecutions 
in the country.23 This was done because public servants were not responsible to 
Parliament and, on high grounds of policy it was deemed necessary that  the 
government should  have control over prosecutions.24  
 
As a result, the Attorneys-General lost all their independence, with the authority to 
prosecute being assigned to them by the Minister of Justice.25 This amendment of 
the law sought to guarantee Parliamentary responsibility for prosecutorial decisions. 
In motivating for the curtailment of the Attorneys-General’s powers, the then Minister 
of Justice, Tielman Roos, stated as follows: 
`The Chief reason why it is necessary to put this bill (the 1926 Amendment Act) on the 
statute books is, in my opinion, that there is no authority whatsoever over, and no 
responsibility of the Attorneys-General. Parliamentary responsibility is completely 
absent.’26 
 
Despite Roos’s giving assurances that the independence of the Attorneys-General’s 
office would still be respected, two Attorneys-General resigned in protest against this 
                                                          
21 Van Zyl Smit and Steyn (2008:138). 
22 Schönteich (2001:32). 
23 Bekker (1995:27).  
24 Bekker (1995:27). 
25 JC Keuthen The South African Prosecution Services: Linchpin of the South African Criminal 
Justice System? (unpublished LLM mini-dissertation, University of Cape Town, 2007) 10. 
26 See Schönteich (2001:32). 
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legislation.27 The effect of the 1935 legislation, and the subsequent versions 
contained in the Criminal Procedure Act until the early 1990s, was that there was no 
formal separation of powers between an Attorneys-General and the executive, and 
that direct or indirect political influence was possible.28 While, in practice, the Minister 
seldom interfered with the decision of the Attorneys-General, in law, this provision 
ensured that the Minister had ultimate control over the prosecutions.29       
 
However, as the strain of shouldering both political and prosecutorial responsibility 
weighed too heavily on the Minister of Justice, in 1935 the Attorneys-General were 
once again vested with the power of prosecution, but under the control of the 
Minister of Justice.30 This meant ‘the Minister was entitled to issue directions to 
Attorneys-General to exercise their powers directly in any specific matter and 
reverse any decision arrived at by an Attorneys-General.’31 The Attorneys-General 
needed only to give reasons for his decisions if asked by the Minister of Justice.32  
 
After the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948, it introduced its apartheid policies 
and therefore regarded the criminal justice system as a useful tool to enforce its 
laws. It found the manner in which the relationship between Attorneys-General and 
the Executive somewhat loose and in need of tighter arrangement, with more 
political control. In 1957 Parliament accordingly passed a law, giving the Minister of 
                                                          
27 Keuthen (2007:10). 
28 Schönteich (2001:32). 
29 Schönteich (2001:32).  
30 See Sec 1 of the General Law Amendment Act 46 of 1935. 
31 Keuthen (2007:10). 
32 Schönteich (2001:32).  
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Justice the power to direct an Attorneys-General, to reverse his decision, and 
exercise his authority function.33 This amendment was introduced during the period 
that the Treason Trial was being held, and ostensibly because the Attorneys-General 
of the then Transvaal had in fact declined to prosecute the 156 persons on charges 
of treason, but that the Minister had insisted that the trial should go ahead.34 This 
meant that thenceforth the Minister had the legal right to take over the role of 
Attorneys-General and Solicitors-General at his own discretion.  
 
While in law the Minister of Justice had the final say, Bekker, a former Attorneys-
General of that era, has stated that in practice, the Minister did not interfere with the 
prosecutorial discretion of Attorneys-General. According to Bekker, the Minister 
accepted, as a rule, the decisions they took.35 Bekker states furthermore that, while 
this ‘did not apply as a rule’, ‘[t]he back-door for Ministerial interference in the 
exercise of the functions of the Attorneys-General was, it seems, always left open.’36 
He concludes therefore that ‘[t]he Attorneys-General (or for that matter his 
representatives: state advocates in the Supreme Court and prosecutors in the lower 
courts), enjoyed a very wide and unfettered discretion. Even the courts showed a 
marked disinclination to control, or even to comment on, the exercise of this 
discretion.’37 Bekker relates an instance in which the court refused to issue a 
mandamus to compelling a prosecution, while in another case the court refused to 
interdict an Attorneys-General from prosecuting where he had decided to do so. In 
                                                          
33 Section 45 (3) of the General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1957. 
34 See Fernandez (2008:134). 
35 Bekker (1995:27).  
36 Bekker (1995:27). 
37 Bekker (1995:27).  
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yet another case, the court refused to direct the Attorneys-General to decide within a 
specified period whether or not he intended indicting certain accused. The court saw 
no reason to interfere as the Attorneys-General acted within his powers. A court 
would interfere only if the Attorneys-General acted in bad faith.38 
 
However, Nico Horn relates a case where executive interference by the South 
African government took place in the then South African-controlled South West 
Africa. 39  This related to the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) 
activist, Ishmail Shifidi, who was brutally murdered by the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) at a political rally in Windhoek. The Attorneys-General for 
the then South West Africa instituted criminal proceedings against the five members 
of the SANDF. The South African government tried unsuccessfully, through the 
Minister of Justice, to put pressure on the Attorneys-General to stop the prosecution. 
Then the then State President of South Africa resorted to Section 103 of the Defence 
Act No. 44 of 1957 to issue a certificate stopping any prosecution against the 
members of the SANDF for acts committed in their operational area. As a result, the 
Administrator-General of the South West Africa, succumbing to pressure, issued a 
separate certificate to halt the prosecution.40  Other than the Namibian case, 
                                                          
38 Bekker (1995:27).  
39 N Horn `The independence of the prosecutorial authority of South Africa and Namibia: A 
comparative study’ (internet/comm articles 2008) available at 
http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/Independence_Judiciary/horn2.pdf 
(accessed 20 June 2013). 
40 Horn (2008). 
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anecdotal evidence suggests that Ministerial interference hardly ever occurred, and 
in any case, the legal provisions allowing it were often strongly criticised.41 
In 1992 the position of the Attorneys-General underwent another radical 
transformation. The Attorneys-General Act No 92 of 1992 elevated Attorneys-
General from the status of civil servants and gave them security of tenure.42 They 
could be removed from office only with the consent of Parliament, and only on the 
grounds of misconduct, continued ill-health or if the incumbent was incapable of 
carrying out his or her duties efficiently. 43  
 
The Minister’s power to interfere with an Attorneys-General’s decisions was removed 
and the authority to institute prosecutions became the sole responsibility of the 
attorneys-general and their delegates, free of Ministerial interference. They were 
accountable only to Parliament, but only in the limited sense that Parliament could 
question them about their annual reports. The function of the Minister of Justice was 
therefore reduced to that tabling the annual reports of the provincial Attorneys-
General in Parliament. As regards how an Attorney-general performed his or her 
function, all that the Minister could require was that an Attorneys-General report to 
him on the handling of certain cases, not more.  
 
Of course, the question that crops up is why was the law transformed so radically? 
Given the fact that this change was effected only two years after Nelson Mandela’s 
release from prison and just two years before the holding of the first free democratic 
elections in South Africa, it would not be unreasonable to argue that the outgoing 
                                                          
41 Horn (2008). 
42 Sec 4 of the Attorney-General Act 92 of 1992 (hereafter Attorney-General Act). 
43 Secs 3 and 4 of the Attorney-General Act. 
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apartheid government wished to insulate Attorneys-General once and for all against 
any potential interference in prosecutorial discretion by a prospective ANC 
government. The ANC viewed this move as an attempt by the old regime to protect 
the entrenched position of the incumbent Attorneys-General.44 They believed that 
some of the Attorneys-General played a significant role in the aggressive 
prosecutions of political cases during the apartheid era.45 This point of view is 
substantiated in the judgment of the Supreme Court of appeal handed down by 
harms DP, which reads as follows:  
`The daunting prospect of the Minister of Justice, in the new South Africa, giving 
directions for prosecutions against the architects and executioners of the apartheid 
policy, galvanized the mostly white legislature to pass the Attorneys-General Act, No 
92 of 1992, (the AG Act), in its death throes. The AG Act took away all political control 
over prosecutions ….Section 108(1) of the Interim Constitution repeated the notion of 
an absence of political interference, when it vested Attorneys-Generals with the power 
to institute prosecutions on behalf of the State.’46 
 
The change brought about by the 1992 law remained in place until the adoption of 
the Constitution in 1996.  
 
8.  Conclusion on the pre-1994 status of the Attorney-General 
 
The historical review shows that throughout the successive colonial administrations 
and during apartheid era, the prosecution service was, except for the first 26 years 
into Union, not entirely free of political control.  The lesson that can be drawn from 
this historical enquiry is that where the heads of prosecution services are aligned to 
the Executive, or where the line between the exercise of the prosecutorial function 
                                                          
44 Keuthen (2007:11). 
45 Keuthen (2007:11). 
46 Zuma v NDPP [2009] 1 All SA 54 (N) at para 80.  
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and performance of executive duties overlaps, the image of justice is blemished and 
public resentment becomes manifest. The Attorney-General Act of 1992 made a 
significant break with the past and granted the prosecution services true 
independence to carry out their functions free from increased executive control. 
However, as indicated, the timing of the passing of the legislation – at the dawn of 
the democratic South Africa – made the sudden change of heart by the Nationalist 
government suspicious and resulted in the ruling ANC government’s denouncing of 
the Act,  which is discussed  in the next chapter. 
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                                                CHAPTER 3 
 
                                  The National Prosecuting Authority at Present 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The adoption of the Constitution in 1996 brought about sweeping changes in the 
administration of criminal justice in South Africa. Fundamental changes had become 
necessary, not least because of the myriad of criminal justice systems that were 
spawned under the apartheid homeland policies, each with its own prosecution 
service and Attorney-General. The Constitution now makes provision for one criminal 
justice system, with one prosecution service with one National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA). This chapter discusses the legal framework which establishes the NPA and 
its significance in a democratic state based on the Rule of Law.  
 
2.  The Legal Framework and Institutional Arrangement regulating the NPA 
2.1 The broad provisions of the law 
The NPA is governed by both the Constitution and the National Prosecuting 
Authority Act (NPA Act).47 Section 108 of the Constitution provides for the 
establishment of a NPA under the direction of a National Director of Public 
Prosecutions (NDPP). The constitutional tenets governing the prosecution system 
were implemented through the NPA Act, which provides that the power to institute 
                                                          
47 NPA Act, 38 of 1998. 
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and conduct criminal prosecutions on behalf of the state, ‘vests in the prosecuting 
authority.’48   
 
3.  Appointments of the NDPP and Directors of Public Prosecutions (NDPPs) 
The Constitution provides for the appointment of the NDPP by the President.49 The 
President sets the remuneration and terms of service of the NDPP, and the NPA Act 
provides that the NDPP’s salary must not be less than that of a High Court judge.50 
The law provides that the NDPP shall hold office for a non-renewable term of 10 
years but must vacate office at the age of 65.51 
 
The President appoints also up to four deputy NDPPs, in consultation with the 
Minister of Justice and the NDPP.  The deputy NDPPs serve until the retirement age 
of 65 and have considerable influence in ensuring continuity in the national office of 
the NPA.  The NPA Act prescribes that the deputy NDPP’s salary shall not be less 
than 85 per cent of the salary of the NDPP.52  The person appointed as NDPP must 
be legally qualified to practice in South African courts and must be a fit a proper 
person, ‘with due regard to his or her experience, conscientiousness and 
integrity….’53  
  
                                                          
48 Sec 20 of the NPA Act. 
49 Sec (179(1)(a). 
50 Sec 17(1). 
51 Sec 12(1). 
52 Sec 17(b). 
53 Sec 9(a) and (b). 
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4. The Relationship between the Minister of Justice and the NDPP 
 
In terms of o the Constitution, ‘the Cabinet member responsible for the 
administration of justice must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting 
authority.’54 The Minister of Justice’s role is confirmed by the NPA Act, which further 
provides that, when the Cabinet Minister exercises this final responsibility, he or she 
must do so in accordance with the Act.55 
 
To enable the minister to exercise such final responsibility, the Constitution lays 
down that the Minister is authorised to request the NDPP to (a) furnish him or her 
information or a report relating to any case dealt with by the NDPP or a DPP; (b) 
provide him or her with reasons for a decision taken by the NDPP in carrying out the 
prosecutorial function; (c) furnish him or her with information regarding the 
prosecution policy and policy directives.56 
 
4.1 Ministerial involvement in the determination of the prosecution policy 
 
The Constitution directs that the prosecution policy must be determined by the NDPP 
in consultation (own emphasis) with the Minister and after consultation (own 
emphasis) with the Directors of Public Prosecutions (DPPPs), of which there is one 
for each province.57 The NDPP must adhere to the prosecution policy and the policy 
directives issued by him or her in the prosecution process. The NPA Act requires 
                                                          
54 Sec 179(6). 
55 Sec 33. 
56 Sec 33(a) to (d). 
57 Sec 21(1). 
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also that the NDPP, in consultation with the Minister and after consultation with the 
DPPs, frame a code of conduct which must be observed by members of the NPA.58 
 
5. The NPA’s and NDPP’s Accountability to Parliament 
 
In terms of the NPA Act, the NPA is accountable to Parliament for its statutory 
powers and responsibilities, ‘including its decisions regarding the institution of 
proceedings’ (own emphasis).59 The NDPP must submit an annual report to 
Parliament. The report is tabled by the Minister.60 From the above, it is clear that the 
NDPP’s responsibility to the Minister, as political head of the Department of Justice 
and  Cabinet member, is confined to furnishing him or her with information relating to 
cases dealt with by the NPA and to hand over to him or her the NPA’s annual report. 
 
6.  Independence of the NDPP 
 
The Constitution and the NPA Act guarantee the independence of the NPA in regard 
to its performance of the prosecutorial function. Both the Constitution and NPA Act 
require also that the NPA do its work ‘without fear, favour and prejudice’ and subject 
only to the Constitution and the law.61  This obligation was confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court in the certification of the Constitution in 1996. Again, both the 
Constitution and NPA Act prohibit and make it a crime for any person, politician and 
government official alike to interfere in the work of the NPA, including the decision to 
                                                          
58 Sec 22(6). 
59 Sec 35(1). 
60 Sec 35(2). 
61 Sec 179(4) of the Constitution and Sec 32(1)(a) of the NPA Act. 
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select which cases to prosecute and not to prosecute.62 Such prohibition is in line 
with international standards63 confirmed by the UN Guidelines and other international 
soft-law standards.64  
 
Further protection for prosecutorial independence is found in section 22 (4) (f) of the 
Act, which requires the NDPP to bring the United Nations Guidelines on the Role of 
the Prosecutors to the attention of all prosecutors and to ‘promote their respect for 
and compliance with [the Guidelines] within the framework of national legislation.’65 
These Guidelines mandate that ‘[i]n performance of their duties, prosecutors shall 
protect the public interest, act with objectivity, take proper account of the position of 
the suspect and the victim and pay attention to all relevant circumstances,  
irrespective of whether they are to the advantage or disadvantage of the suspect.’66 
 
How the law and institutional arrangements function in practice is the subject of the 
next chapter, which addresses concretely whether the functional independence of 
the NDPP applies also in high-profile cases which are politically sensitive. However, 
                                                          
62 See Sec 32(1) (b) of the NPA Act. 
63 Redpath (2012:1).  
64 United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors adopted by the Eighth United Nations  
    Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba (27 August to   
   7 September 1990). See also International Association of Prosecutors found at 
      http://www.iap- association.org/ (accessed on 15 November 2013). 
65 Sec 22 the NPA Act. 
66 Sec 13(b) of the United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, adopted by the Eighth  
    United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana,     
    Cuba (27 August to 7 September 1990). 
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before going on to answer the question whether the legal provisions insulate the 
NPA against political interference, it is useful to compare first the manner in which 
the prosecution service is regulated structurally in three other common law 
jurisdictions. The comparison will limit itself to the theoretical basis on which the 
prosecution service in the compared countries is constructed. The countries chosen 
are Botswana, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). 
 
The comparison is based on the founding legislation, mandate, appointment of the 
head of the agency, institutional and structural arrangement and the prosecutorial 
independence of the agency from the executive. These jurisdictions were chosen, 
first because they share a similar common law background with South Africa and 
second, on account of the fact that their adjective law derives from English law. A 
comparison of South Africa, Botswana and the US is significant also because all 
three countries were English colonies. It is, therefore, worthwhile to understand how 
in each country as strategic an entity as the prosecution service, which plays a 
crucial role in enforcing criminal laws authored by the politically powerful, has 
evolved in the post-colonial period. Furthermore, these jurisdictions, including South 
Africa’s, will be tested against other international instruments regulating prosecutors 
and prosecution services. The chapter will end with a brief excursion into the soft law 
standards on the matter of prosecutorial independence. 
 
7.  The Situation of the Prosecution Service in Comparative Perspective  
7.1. The United Kingdom 
In the UK, the main public prosecution service, established in terms of the 
Prosecution of Offences Act of 1985, is the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), which 
is headed by a Director of Public  Prosecutions(DPP). The DPP is superintended by 
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the Attorney-General to whom he is accountable. The Attorney-General is, in turn, 
accountable to Parliament. The office of the Attorney-General is a Ministerial 
Department, which means the Attorney-General is effectively part of the Executive 
and is a member of Cabinet Committees.67  
 
In the UK, the CPS is a non-Ministerial government department or agency. A non-
Ministerial government department is a department or ministry of a government that 
is not headed by a Government Minister or Government Secretary, and answers 
directly to a legislature. Such departments are created to remove political 
interference in public affairs such as prosecution, charities, human rights and racial 
equality. They carry out executive functions as stipulated by the legislature. The 
head of the department is often appointed by a government Minister. In terms of this 
arrangement, the CPS’ decisions whether to prosecute or not should be taken 
independent of any interference particularly by the executive. To this effect, the CPS 
has two policies to ensure its operational independence. These are the Core Quality 
Standards68 and the Code for Crown Prosecutors.69  However, only the Code is 
                                                          
67 The Governance of Britain: A Consultation on the Role of the Attorney General Cm 7192 
Presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty Xxxxx (2007) at 9. 
68 The Core Quality Standards policy is akin to the Policing Pledge. It was launched when the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer QC, publicly announced its introduction in 2009. 
available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/core_quality_standards/preface_and_introduction.html 
(accessed 15 December 2012). 
69 The Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 mandates the DPP in Sec 10 to issue the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors to assist prosecutors in their decision-making function. See the Prosecution of 
Offences Act of 1985 and also the Code for Crown Prosecutors para 1.2. 
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issued by law.70 The Core Quality Standards guides and protect prosecutors71 in 
their decision-making function.  It is a set of twelve standards which outline what the 
service does, how decisions are made, and the service that the public can expect.  
 
The Code for Crown Prosecutors set out the basis upon which prosecutions are 
refused, discontinued or proceeded with. It provides that `[t]he DPP exercises his 
functions independently, subject to the superintendence of the AG who is 
accountable to Parliament for the work of the prosecution service.’72 The Code 
emphasises that ‘the independence of prosecutors is of fundamental constitutional 
importance.’73 It states further that a case will only be prosecuted firstly, if there is 
sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction against each 
defendant on each charge, and secondly, if it is in the public interest to prosecute. 
For CPS to determine whether or not to charge a person on the basis of availability 
of evidence balanced with the public interests, the Code for Crown Prosecutors 
provides that the CPS must first decide, after evidence is gathered by the police, 
whether there is sufficient evidence for the case to be prosecuted. Officers provide 
                                                          
70 The Code for Crown Prosecutors para 1.9. 
71 The term ‘prosecutors’ in this Code,  is used to describe members of the prosecution service who 
are designated as Crown Prosecutors; prosecutors who are members of the RCPO; Associate 
Prosecutors who are designated under Sec 7A of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 and who 
exercise their powers in accordance with the instructions issued by the DPP; and other members 
of the RCPO who are designated by the DPP in his capacity as the Director of the Revenue and 
Customs Prosecutions under section 39 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 
2005. See The Code for Crown Prosecutors para 1.3. 
72 The Code for Crown Prosecutors para 1.1. 
73 The Code for Crown Prosecutors para 1.5. 
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the prosecutor with the evidence gathered and although there may be a decision not 
to charge74 at that stage, the prosecutor will assist the officer by explaining what 
additional work or evidence could raise the case to the required standard. If further 
evidence is not available, no further action may be taken against the suspect. 
However, even if there is sufficient evidence to prosecute, the Crown Prosecutors 
must still decide whether a prosecution would be in the public interest 
 
7.2 United Sates 
 
The US criminal justice system authorises that states may prosecute only crimes that 
are committed within their boundaries. Most significantly, most local prosecutors are 
elected to serve as the principal prosecuting authorities in their jurisdictions and are, 
accordingly, broadly responsible to the electorate for the effective enforcement of 
criminal law.  In contrast, the prosecutorial power of the US government extends 
over the entire federation of the United States. All federal prosecutors are therefore 
part of the United States Department Justice, whose employees are all overseen by 
the Attorney General. The Attorney-General has the primary responsibility of 
conducting all litigation in the Supreme Court in which the US government is 
                                                          
74 Charging decisions involve the prosecutor applying his or her knowledge of the law to the facts    
    before them; in some cases there may be more than one criminal offence that applies to the  
    circumstances of the case. In order to achieve consistency in the decision-making process,  
    prosecutors refer to Charging Standards for offences, agreed between the CPS and Police. In  
    addition, they may refer to current CPS policy and guidance on the prosecution of certain types of  
    offences, such as domestic violence and hate crime available at  
     http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/core_quality_standards/preface_and_introduction.html     
     (accessed 15 December 2012). 
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concerned. He advises also on questions of law when required to do so by the 
President or when requested by the heads of any of the government departments. 
 
The US Attorney-General serves as a member of the Cabinet. He is, therefore, also 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate and can be removed by the 
President at any time. He accounts to the President. Below him in rank is the Deputy 
Attorney-General, followed by the Associate Attorney-General and the Solicitor-
General, all of whom form the executive within the Office of the Attorney-General. 
Below them are the US Attorneys who reside within the DOJ. However, the AG does 
not have power to appoint the US Attorneys. This is still the prerogative of the 
President, with the confirmation of the Senate. US Attorneys are, therefore, also 
political appointees, although they are expected to serve impartially.  
 
7.3 Botswana 
 
The Attorney-General’s Chambers is an extra Ministerial department under the 
Office of the President and is headed by the Attorney-General (AG). In terms of Sec 
51 of the Constitution the Attorney-General is the Principal legal adviser to the 
government.  The Attorney General is also an ex-officio Member of Cabinet, and 
serves on various policy committees. Prior to the 2005 constitutional amendments, 
the Attorney-General was responsible for instituting and conducting prosecutions at 
the public instance. In 2005, the powers to prosecute were transferred to the Director 
of Public Prosecutions (DPP).75 The DPP is supervised administratively by the 
Attorney-General. The DPP’s independence is thus affected to the extent that he or 
                                                          
75 See Section 51A of the Constitution of Botswana of 1996 (as amended in 2006).  
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she is dependent for resources on the office of the Attorney-General, who also has 
the authority to authorise the budget of the DPP’s office.76 
 
Although section 51A (6) (a) of the Constitution states that the DPP ‘shall not be 
subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.’ Subsection (b) 
has a sting in its tail in that it the DPP must consult with the Attorney-General in 
cases considered by the latter to be of national importance. However, there is no 
explanation of what is meant by ‘of national importance.’  What constitutes national 
importance is purely in the discretion of the Attorney-General.77 The present DPP, 
Leonard Sechele, is of the view that the question of determining what is of national 
importance raises an important issue, namely: ‘How is the Attorney-General to know 
a matter is of national importance before the DPP has instituted criminal 
proceedings?’78 In practice, the process is started by the DPP, who prepares a 
summary of the case and then submits it to the Attorney-General for consultation. 
Sechele points out that for this arrangement to work, it is necessary that a mature 
relationship exists between the Attorney-General and the DPP, ‘as the latter can 
frustrate determinations of whether a case is of national importance to be done [sic] 
before an institution of criminal proceedings.’79  
 
It is still unclear whether or not the DPP’s office is part of the Attorney-General’s 
Chamber. The latter believes that this is the case, but the DPP disagrees. The DPP 
                                                          
76 L B Sechele ‘The Independence of the DPP (A Case of Botswana)’ (Presentation by the Director of  
     Public Prosecutions’ at the Judicial conference held at Palapye 25-26 July 2013) at 4. 
77 Sechele (2013:8). 
78 Sechele (2013:7). 
79 Sechele (2013:8). 
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insists that his independence is manifest in that his removal from office is the same 
as that of the removal of a judge’s removal from office.80  That is, it must be 
preceded by the investigation by a tribunal which then make recommendations to the 
president who, in turn, implements such recommendations. And this is despite the 
fact that the DPP IS a civil servant. However, this arrangement is not without 
complications. The inherent challenges are that the DPP’s staff ‘remains employees 
of the Attorney-General’s Chambers and are appointed by the Attorney General. To 
this effect, the Attorney-General’ also has power to decide whether or not to 
promotions the DPP’s staff.’81 In practice, and due to personnel shortages, most of 
the criminal prosecutions, except very serious cases, are delegated are delegated to 
the Botswana Police Service (BPS), the Directorate on Corruption and Economic 
Crime (DCEC) and the local police.82 
8. Commentary 
 
A common feature of the three common law jurisdictions compared is that, like South 
Africa, the head of the prosecution service of the country as a whole, is appointed by 
the political head of government. But unlike South Africa, where the political head of 
the Department of Justice is the Minister of Justice, in all three other countries it is 
the Attorney-General who heads up the Department of Justice, in addition to being a 
Government minister and a member of Cabinet. While in practice this model has 
                                                          
80 Sechele (2013:11-12). 
81 Sechele (2013:13) 
82 Attorney General’s Chambers Our History available at  
     http://www.landsandhousing.gov.bw/index.php/about-us/our-history.html (accessed on 17 October   
     2015). 
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functioned over centuries, it is not without its problems, for it is hard to dispel the 
suspicion that in high-profile cases, political considerations do not impact on the 
decision whether or not to prosecute. As seen in the case of Botswana, although the 
DPP enjoys limitless prosecutorial freedom, the Attorney-General, a member of 
government, has a say whether a prosecution should go ahead in a case of national 
importance. South Africa has never subscribed to this model, except during the early 
Dutch period at the Cape and under the Boer Republics. Between 1926 and 1935, 
the Minister of Justice was also the chief Attorney-General of the Union of South 
Africa, but this arrangement was abandoned because the Minister found it onerous 
to perform both functions. Even during the apartheid era, when the regime had every 
reason to ensure that its racist criminal laws were enforced unflinchingly, the 
Attorneys-General were not Cabinet Ministers, though they were accountable to a 
Minister of Justice. What political considerations went into their appointment is 
another matter. 
 
In comparison to the three other countries, the present South Africa set-up, 
according to which the NDPP does not account to the Minister of Justice, but to 
Parliament, makes the structure of South African prosecution service unique. The 
South African model thus differs radically from the classic Commonwealth model, as 
represented by the three common law countries used as comparators, in which 
Attorneys-General ‘come and go with government.’83 
 
But do these differences matter at all? This question cannot be answered in a 
straightforward ‘yes’ or ‘no’, needs to be answered in a differentiated way. The 
                                                          
83 P S James Introduction to English Law 11th ed (London: Butterworths 1985) 56. 
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differences do not matter with regard to the prosecution of ordinary crimes. In such 
cases the decision whether or not to prosecute does not depend on the relationship 
between the country’s chief of prosecutions and the government of the day. What is 
more, the decision not to prosecute someone caught shoplifting will hardly raise an 
eyebrow. Usually, where there is a prima facie case against the suspect, and there is 
sufficient evidence, a prosecution is instituted, whatever the jurisdiction.  For 
example, the Prosecution Policy of South Africa’s NPA states that, in deciding 
whether or not to institute criminal proceedings, the prosecutor must assess first 
‘whether there is sufficient and admissible evidence to provide a reasonable 
prospect of a successful prosecution. There must be a reasonable prospect of a 
conviction, otherwise the prosecution should not be commenced or continued.’84 
  
However, when it comes to exercising prosecutorial discretion in regard to high-
profile, politically sensitive cases because prosecute in high-profile, politically 
sensitive cases, where the Attorney-General is a member of Parliament, or of the 
government Cabinet, the decision he or she takes with regard to whether or not to 
institute a criminal prosecution, is of huge public interest and subject to close public 
scrutiny. This is because of the closeness of the Attorney-General to the ruling 
political party. In the UK, for example, there have been several high-profile, politically 
sensitive cases in which the decision not prosecute has elicited much controversy.85  
                                                          
84 NPA Policy Manual para 4 at A3. 
85 See, for example, Reform of the Office of Attorney General House of Lords Select Committee on 
the Constitution 7th Report of Session 2007–08 at Paras 6-18. See also  C Turpin Review  of Jll J  
    Edwards’ The Attorney General, Politics and the Public Interest (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1884)  
    in (1985) 44 Cambridge Law Journal Review of Jll J Edwards’ The Attorney General, Politics and    
    the Public Interest (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1884) 480 at 481. 
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In South Africa, it should not, in theory, the nature of the case should, in theory , not 
matter, for the NDPP operates outside Parliament and has no active role in it, except 
to report to it annually. Besides, nowhere does the law provide for political 
interference in the discretionary powers of the NPA; in fact, as noted above, the law 
criminalises such interference. Yet, despite these constitutional safeguards against 
political interference, there are worrying questions concerning the NPA’s ability to act 
independently in politically sensitive cases. Why, for example, has the NPA failed to 
pursue the prosecutions of the hundreds of persons who were refused amnesty by 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that looked into gross human rights 
violations perpetrated between 1960 and 1993, and this, despite South Africa’s 
obligation to prosecute crimes against humanity? Put, differently, why has the 
government not provided the NPA with sufficient resources to pursue such 
prosecutions?  In his published doctoral thesis, Bubenzer writes as follows with 
regard to the lack of post-TRC prosecutions: 
`The lack of a clear commitment and concentrated efforts after 1998 essentially reveal 
a lack of political will from the government to properly support post-TRC 
prosecutions….This lack of political will has found expression when the government 
intervened in a specific case and interrupted all proceedings for 13 months by 
imposing a moratorium without compelling reasons, thereby further delaying trials from 
taking place.’86 
 
The same lack of political will is currently inhibiting the government from establishing 
a truly independent anti-corruption agency. The DPCI is still not complying with the 
court order to be properly insulated from political control. For the same reason the 
NPA is struggling to carry out its function free from political interference.  
  
                                                          
86 O Bubenzer Post-TRC Prosecutions in South Africa (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2009) at 230. 
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9.  Conclusion 
 
The various models discussed in this chapter present their own peculiar problems.  
The chapter has shown that whatever the relationship between the head of a 
country’s prosecution service and the government of the day, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion does not mirror what the law envisages, for politics cannot 
be thought out of the equation.  The next chapter pursues this subject with respect to 
concrete cases that have cropped up in South Africa.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
The Functional Independence of the NDPP 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
In terms of the constitution and the Act, ‘independence’ is fundamental in the 
NDPP’s prosecutorial decision-making function. However, this is not always the 
case, particularly when it comes to high-profile and politically sensitive cases. This is 
revealed when tested against the corruption case of Jacob Zuma, in the main, and 
his associates. The case law that will be discussed in this chapter relates primarily to 
the court proceedings and judgments in the case of Jacob Zuma and Others v the 
NDPP, or alternatively, the NDPP v Jacob Zuma and Others.1 This chapter will deal 
also with the legislation on the disbandment of the DSO or Scorpions and its 
incorporation into the South African Police Services (SAPS). This discussion 
necessarily entails a study of the case of Glenister v the President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others, which deals with the issue whether the unit that succeeded 
the Scorpions, namely, the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI) can be 
said to be as independent as its predecessor.2   
 
                                                          
1 Thint Holding (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v NDPP; Zuma v NDPP 2008 (2) SACR (557) (CC), Zuma 
   and Another v NDPP and Others 2006 (1) SACR 468 (D) and Zuma v NDPP 2008 HC (71) and  
   Zuma v NDPP 2008 (2) SACR 421 (CC). 
2 Hugh Glenister v the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 48/10) [2011] 
ZACC 6 (17 March 2011). See also the NPA Amendment Act 58 of 2008. 
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Also included in the compass of this chapter, and worth an analysis, are the 
controversial decisions taken by the NPA on criminal matters involving high-profile 
politicians and business people associated with Zuma. These include prominent 
figures such as the former Crime Intelligence head, Richard Mdluli, the former 
Premier of Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN), Zweli Mkhize, the former Speaker of the KZN 
provincial legislature, Peggy Nkonyeni, and KZN’s provincial Member of the 
Executive Council responsible for economic development, Mike Mabuyakhulu. 
 
2. The Zuma corruption case 
 
Jacob Zuma’s corruption case has its origin in the acquisition by the South African 
government in 1999 of strategic armaments for the Department of Defence 
(commonly referred to as the ‘arms deal’). But while the case originates from the 
arms deal, the charges against Zuma are not arms deal- related. In September 1999, 
the then Pan African Congress Member of Parliament, Patricia de Lille, alleged in 
Parliament that the procurement process was riddled with improprieties. In response 
to these allegations, in 2000 a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) made up of the Auditor-
General, the Public Protector, the NPA and the Special Investigative Unit (SIU) 
(which was later withdrawn) was appointed by Parliament to investigate De Lille’s 
claims. The JIT found no evidence of corruption in the ultimate selection of the 
bidders, but said that ‘there may have been individuals and institutions who used or 
attempted to use their positions improperly, within government departments, 
parastatal bodies and in private capacity, to obtain undue benefits in relation to these 
packages.…’3 Based on this finding, the DSO extended its investigation into 
possible criminal conducts relating to the arms deal. During the course of this 
                                                          
3 L McCarthy’s answering affidavit in State v Zuma and Others Case No CC358/05, para 15.7. 
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investigation the corrupt relationship between Zuma and Shaik was 
uncovered.   
 
In 2002 it emerged during the investigations against Shabir Shaik, Zuma’s financial 
advisor, that Zuma was not only corruptly linked to Shaik but also with his group of 
companies and his private dealings.4  This was further confirmed by the discovery in 
2001 of an encrypted fax indicating that Shaik and Zuma concluded an agreement 
with the French companyThétard to the effect that in exchange for his protection of 
the electronics manufacturer Thomson-CSF against the investigation into the arms 
deal and support and lobby for Thomson-CSF in future projects, Zuma would receive 
R500 000 per annum.5 The existence of this agreement was revealed by Thétard’s 
former secretary, Sue Delique, and also confirmed under oath by the auditors for 
Thomson-CSF, Arthur Andersen.6 Despite these averments, in 2003, the then 
NDPP, Bulelani Ngcuka, took a decision not to prosecute Zuma together with Shaik 
because, according to him, there was no prospect of a successful prosecution.7 In 
2005 Shaik was found guilty on two counts of corruption and one of fraud related to 
the arms deal and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment by the Durban High Court.  
 
Following Shaik’s successful prosecution and conviction, Ngcuka’s decision not to 
prosecute Zuma was reviewed in 2005 by Pikoli, Ngcuka’s successor. Pikoli reached 
the conclusion that there was indeed a reasonable prospect of a successful 
prosecution.  His decision to prosecute was based solely on his objective 
                                                          
4 McCarthy paras 31 and 32. 
5 McCarthy para 22. 
6 McCarthy para 20. 
7 Bulelani Ngcuka’s supporting affidavit in State v Zuma and Others CASE NO: CC358/05 para 30. 
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assessment of the admissible evidence that emerged in the Shaik trial, among 
others, and the strength of the prospects of a successful conviction.8  These 
prospects were based, inter alia, on the Durban High Court’s judgment on the merits 
that there was a mutually beneficial relationship between Zuma and Shaik and his 
business enterprises which bordered on corruption. Between 1994 and 1999 Shaik 
and his companies paid Zuma a total sum of R1 340 078, which escalated to more 
than R4 million in July 2005. In the Shaik case, the Court reasoned that: 
  
[i]f Zuma could not repay the money, how else could he do so than by providing the 
help of his name and political office as and when it was asked, particularly in the field 
of government contracted work, which is what Shaik was hoping to benefit from. And 
Shaik must have foreseen and, by inference, did foresee that if he made these 
payments, Zuma would respond in that way. The conclusion that he realised this, even 
if only after he started the dependency of Zuma upon his contributions, seems to us to 
be irresistible.9 
 
 Zuma was then charged with two counts of corruption in June 2005, but these 
charges were reversed by the North Gauteng High Court when it found, per 
Nicholson J, that there was political interference in the prosecution of Zuma.10  
 
In 2009 Zuma was re-charged with 783 counts of corruption, fraud and racketeering. 
Throughout the time that he was being investigated, Zuma said that he was 
innocent, claiming that  he was the  victim of political conspiracy hatched by the then 
President Mbeki, together with Ngcuka, former Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils, 
and the NPA in general.  This conspiracy, he maintained, was aimed at destroying 
                                                          
8 Vusi Pikoli’s supporting Affidavit in State v Zuma and Others CASE NO: CC358/05 para 12. 
9  McCarthy para 83.6. 
10 Zuma v NDPP (8652/08) [2008] ZAKZ HC 71 (12 September 2008). 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
his reputation, undermining his political position, and preventing him from becoming 
the President of South Africa.11 He called for his day in court to clear his name. 
However, despite his protestations as to his innocence and his calling for his day in 
court, Zuma did everything possible to avoid going to court, and used whatever 
appropriate platform for him to clear his name and expose his detractors. Zuma’s 
claims of a conspiracy being plotted against him were found to be baseless, as by 
the National Executive Committee of his own party, the ANC, could not provide 
evidence to support his claims.12  Furthermore, Zuma declined an invitation to testify 
before the Hefer Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of spying against the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions, Ngcuka, where he could have substantiated 
his claims and possibly have put the matter to rest.13   
 
Notwithstanding Zuma’s failure to refute convincingly and publicly the validity of the 
charges against him, in 2009,  the then acting NDPP, Mokotedi Mpshe, dropped the 
charges against Zuma, citing as his reason the fact that there had been  ‘collusion’ 
between the former NDPP, Ngcuka, and former head of the Scorpions, Leonard 
McCarthy. He said that McCarthy had abused the legal process for purposes 
extraneous to the prosecution, before and after the ANC’s elective conference in 
Polokwane in 2007.14  At the time of writing, Mpshe’s decision is being challenged in 
                                                          
11 Maduna, paras 5, 7 and 12. 
12 Ngcuka para 6. 
13 Maduna para 10. 
14 NPA’s full   statement   on   the   dropping   of   corruption   charges   against   Zuma   available   at                   
http://www.bing.com/search?q=NPA+full+statement+on+dropping+of+Zuma+charges&FORM=AA
RBLB&PC=MAAR&MKT=en-za (accessed 11 March 2011). 
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court by the official opposition party in Parliament, the Democratic Alliance, for being 
irrational and unconstitutional.   
 
3.  How independent is the NPA of political interference? 
 
The primary shortcoming in the legal framework governing the NPA is that neither 
the Constitution nor the NPA is explicit about the independence of the NPA. In fact, 
there is nowhere in the Constitution and the Act where the word ‘independent’ or 
‘independence’ in relation to the NPA is mentioned. It is merely implied thereby being 
`read into’ the law. The fact that the Constitutional Court in the Certification of the 
Constitution held that the provision of ‘without fear, favour and prejudice’ and subject 
only to the Constitution and the law in the legal framework is ‘a constitutional 
guarantee of independence’ for the NPA is clearly not enough to strengthen the 
safeguards that guarantee and protect the NDPP from victimisation if he strictly 
observes his oath of office.15 Bennum regards this interpretation as a missed 
opportunity by the Constitutional Court to clarify this implicitly in the law.16 In relation 
to the case S v Zuma, Bennum argues, correctly it is submitted, that the word 
‘independent’ as applied to the NPA must be used in a qualified sense when 
compared to the independence enjoyed by the courts. The Constitution states 
expressly that courts are ‘independent and subject only to the Constitution and the 
law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.’17 
 
                                                          
15 Ex Parte: Chairperson of the National Assembly. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the   
   Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 146. 
16 M Bennum (2009) In ‘S v Zuma: the implications for prosecutors’ decisions’ (2009) 22 South   
   African Journal of Criminal Justice (371-390) 378. 
17 Sec 165(2) of the Constitution. 
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Equally, the absence of the word ‘independent’ in the NPA’s founding laws modifies 
the degree of independence it enjoys if compared to the so-called Chapter Nine 
Institutions, amongst which are the Office of the Public Protector and the Auditor–
General and the Electoral Commission. Of these institutions, the Constitutional 
language guaranteeing their independence is unambiguous and is almost identical to 
the independence that the Constitution envisages for the courts.18 
 
The question on the independence of the NPA cannot be divorced from, or 
discussed without reference to the structural and functional relationship between the 
NPA and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development. The Constitution 
and the NPA Act place the Minister of Justice at the highest echelon of the NPA and 
empower him to exercise final responsibility over the NPA. The NDPP is obligated to 
‘furnish the Minister with information or a report with regard to any case, matter or 
subject dealt with by the National Director or a Director in the exercise of their 
powers, the carrying out of their duties and the performance of their functions’, while 
at the same time having to observe the principle of prosecutorial independence.19 
 
What ‘final responsibility’ means is not clear. Attempts by the courts to clarify this 
Ministerial role have not helped either. In the case of National Prosecuting Authority 
v Zuma20 the SCA stated that: 
 
`[a]lthough the Minister may not instruct the NPA to prosecute or to decline to 
prosecute or to terminate a pending prosecution, the Minister is entitled to be kept 
informed in respect of all prosecutions initiated or to be initiated which might arouse 
                                                          
18 See Sec 181(2) of the Constitution. 
19 Sec 33(a) of the NPA Act. 
20 National Prosecuting Authority v Zuma (2009). 
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public interest or involve important aspects of legal or prosecutorial authority.’21  
 
 
The right accorded the Minister is meant to enable him or her to exercise final 
responsibility, as contemplated by Section 179 of the Constitution. This, it stated, 
does not in any way mean the Minister is interfering with the prosecutorial function of 
the NPA. 
 
This is paradoxical in that, first, the Minister may not exercise his final responsibility 
effectively without infringing on the prosecutorial function of the NPA, intentionally or 
unintentionally. For instance, it is unthinkable that the NDPP could include in his 
report to the Minister that he is planning to charge the Minister or have him arrested, 
or that he intends to do so with, the President or a fellow cabinet member, without 
the Minister being tempted to halt such action, more so because the NPA’s 
prosecutorial independence is merely implied and not expressly defined in the 
Constitution.  
 
A case in point is that of the former Minister of Justice, Bridget Mabandla, who 
interfered with Pikoli’s prosecutorial discretion. She did through the letter in which 
she instructed Pikoli to stop the prosecution of former Police Commissioner, Jackie 
Selebi. The Minister ignored the fact that she lacked the ‘effective political oversight 
responsibility in respect of the law enforcement elements of the work of the DSO.’22 
The Minister acted contrary to the Constitutional Court’s ruling during the 
Certification of the Constitution and in spite of the fact that interference in the work of 
the NPA is a punishable by law. The Ginwala Commission Report found that the 
                                                          
21 National Prosecuting Authority v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA) para 32. 
22 Khampepe Commission Report (2006)132. 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
Minister’s conduct had in fact breached section 32(1)(b) of the NPA Act, but she was 
never prosecuted.23  Instead, Pikoli was dismissed for upholding the law and oath of 
his office. 24 
 
One of the possible reasons for not making the NPA independent, according to 
Mokoena, is that a wholly independent prosecutorial authority ‘may become a vehicle 
for institutional oppression, if left unchecked by regulation and legislation, as 
evidenced in the Italian example.’25 But on the other hand, ‘democratic or 
hierarchical control’ of the prosecution is an untenable alternative, especially when 
such control is imposed in order to exert influence on individual decisions on whether 
or not to prosecute.26 As earlier stated, this is a misconception. Inserting the word 
‘independent’ in the legal framework of the NPA will not make it wholly independent 
or autonomous from the government. As argued elsewhere in this thesis, the 
Chapter 9 Institutions are a case in point.  
 
3.1 The role of Minister of Justice 
 
 
The NPA Act provides that the NDPP must, in accordance with section 179(5) of the 
Constitution, determine the national prosecution policy with the concurrence of the 
Minister of Justice.27 This means that the Minister must agree with content of the 
prosecution policy before it is made public. However the phrase ‘in concurrence’ 
                                                          
23 Sec 32(1)(b) of the NPA Act. 
24 Tamukamoyo and Mofana (2013). 
25 MT Mokoena  `Taming the Prosecutorial Beast: of Independence, Discretion and Accountability’ 
(2012) 2 Stellenbosch Law Review 297 at 303. 
26 Mokoena (2012:303).  
27 Sec 179(5) of the Constitution. 
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could also be interpreted in a way that suggests that the NDPP has an equal say as 
the Minister in matters relating to the prosecution policy. Wolf concurs with the view 
that the phrase ‘in concurrence’ with the Minister ‘does not signal a relationship of 
subordination typical of an internal executive hierarchy.’28 He contends that if the 
NDPP was meant to have a lesser say on the prosecutorial policy, the law would 
have been worded in a way which ensured this hierarchical status. For example, the 
wording in the law would have been that the Minister determines the prosecution 
policy ‘in consultation with’ or `on the advice of’ the NDPP. Based on the above, Wolf 
correctly concludes that, ‘this can mean only that the prosecuting authority was 
conceived as a state organ in its own right and not as a part of the executive.’29 But 
presently, the NPA is seen by the executive as being part of it and subservient to it.  
 
3.2 The relationship between the NPA and the executive 
 
The Constitutional Court has made it clear that the NPA is not part of the judiciary, 
for public prosecutions are not a judicial function. The Court held that ‘[i]n any event, 
even if it were part of the Judiciary, the mere fact that the appointment of the head of 
the national prosecuting authority is made by the President does not in itself 
contravene the doctrine of separation of powers.’30 That the NPA is part of the 
executive is confirmed by Horn who states as follows: 
 
‘If the prosecutorial function of the state is not part of the judicial functions, and the 
NDPP is appointed by the South African president as head of the national executive, 
                                                          
28 L Wolf (2011) `Pre-and Post-Trial Equality in criminal justice the context of the separation of 
    Powers’ (2011) 14 PER / PELJ 74. 
29 Wolf (2011:74). 
30 Ex Parte: Chairperson of the National Assembly. In re: Certification of the Constitution of      the     
    Republic of South Africa1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 141 G. 
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there can be no doubt where the prosecutorial function of the state fits into the puzzle 
of the three powers of the state: prosecution is part of the executive functions.’31 
 
Consequently, not only the Minister but even the Presidents construes the 
prosecuting authority, by virtue of it being part of the Executive, to be performing 
administrative powers whereas it is in fact responsible for criminal justice.32  This is 
clearly demonstrated in the cases involving politically and economically well-
connected persons.33 Former President Mbeki justified the suspension of Pikoli from 
office with the argument that there was a ‘break-down of relations’ between him and 
the justice Minister.34 This is clearly not one of the grounds for the suspension and / 
or removal of the NDPP from office as envisaged by section 6(a) (i) to (iv) of the 
NPA Act.35  It is normally a ground for dismissing only a director-general of a state 
department, who is a political appointee.36 President Zuma also regards the 
prosecutors as being part of the executive branch, which must take orders from the 
executive.37 In fact, Simelane, the former NDPP who was later dismissed from office, 
confessed that ‘he did not believe that the NPA should be independent from the 
executive’ and therefore that it should be subject to executive orders.38  
                                                          
31 N Horn (2008:129). 
32 Wolf (2011:59). 
33 Redpath (2012:3).  
34 Ginwala Commission Report para 11.1.  
35 Sec 6(a)(i) to (iv) of the NPA Act. 
36 See Wolf (2011:75). 
37 News24 (2009-12-14) available at http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Government-is 
NPAs-boss-Zuma-20091214 (accessed 15 July 2011). 
38 Hlongwane S `Government finally drops Menzi Simelane for good’ Daily Maverick 06 December 
2012, http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-12-06-government-finally-drops-menzi-
simelane-for-good/#.UjMipZYaLIU (accessed 7 May 2013).  
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The danger with these misconceptions by both the executive and the prosecutors is 
that it provides a fertile ground for the ineffectiveness of, inter alia, key safeguards 
for the independence of the NPA. One of them is the provision that: 
  
‘[s]ubject to the Constitution and this Act, no organ of state and no member or 
employee of an organ of state nor any other person shall improperly interfere with, 
hinder or obstruct the prosecuting authority or any member thereof in the exercise, 
carrying out or performance of its, his or her powers, duties and functions.’39  
 
This includes, primarily, the decision to select which cases to prosecute and not to 
prosecute, once prosecution is in progress, to discontinue any criminal 
proceedings.40  
 
In Democratic Alliance v The President of the RSA & Others, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal said in its judgment that the realisation of the independence of the NPA as 
contemplated in the Constitution and the Act depends on the quality and integrity of 
the NDPP who serves as the conduit of the essence of the Act.41 
 
 
It is clear that, the lawmakers did not find it easy to maintain consistency in ensuring 
the independence of the NPA from the executive inasmuch as ensuring some 
degree of oversight by the executive over the NPA. Section 179(6) contains an 
ambivalent provision that the Minister of Justice is ‘responsible for the administration 
of justice’ and ‘must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting authority.’ In 
light of this provision, the NPA’s independence is merely functional, i.e. functional 
independence, since it is part of the executive branch of government. This is 
confirmed by Ngcobo CJ who concludes in the minority judgment that Sub-sections 
                                                          
39 Sec 20(1)(c) of the NPA Act.. 
40 Sec 32(1)(b) of the NPA Act 
41 See DA v President of South Africa (263/11) [2011] ZASCA 241 (1 December 2011). 
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(4) and (6) of section 179 do not intend prosecutors to be independent in a manner 
similar to that of judges.42  
 
Judicial independence has to do with keeping the judiciary institutionally away from 
the other branches of government. Prosecutorial independence, on the other hand, 
has to do with the NPA being part of the executive institutionally, as is the situation at 
present in terms of the NPA Act, but must be accorded the independence to decide 
whether or not to prosecute. This decision has to be guided by the Constitution, the 
NPA Act, and the prosecution policy. 
 
Judges  are  appointed  by  the  President  following  recommendations  from  the  
Judicial Service Commission (JSC) , while the NDPP is appointed directly by the 
President.365 The JSC is chaired by the Chief Justice. It consists of the Chief Justice, 
one Judge President, two practising attorneys, two practising advocates, one teacher 
of law, six members of the National Assembly, four permanent delegates to the 
National Council of Provinces (NCOP), four members designated by the President 
as head of the national executive, and the Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Service. The practising attorneys and advocates and the teacher of law are 
designated by their respective professions; the Judge President is designated by all 
the Judges President; at least three members of the National Assembly must come 
from opposition parties.43  The four delegates of the NCOP must be supported by the 
vote of at least six of the nine provinces. The four presidential appointments are 
made after consultation with the leaders of all the parties in the National Assembly.44 
                                                          
42 See also Wolf (2011:75).  
43 Sec 178(i) of the Constitution. 
44 Sec 178(i) of the Constitution.  
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3.3 Appointment of the NDPP 
  
The CC approved the provision in the constitution that empowers the president to 
appoint the NDPP. In so doing, the court, in effect, failed to acknowledge the fact 
that one state organ can indirectly control another through making such 
appointments and thus compromise the independence of such appointee45 and 
eventually the NPA.  
 
The constitution also provided (in section 179) the president and the executive with a 
passage to appoint in key positions of the NPA people who clearly do not have the 
necessary requirements as contemplated by the law, often with questionable 
integrity in the society. These people have often been pliable and tended to work 
hard in protecting corrupt politicians and their associate criminals from prosecution in 
apparent breach of their oath of office without any consequences. One such 
appointment, as earlier mentioned, is that of Simelane. His appointment was made 
despite the fact that the Ginwala Commission Report had earlier criticised him 
sharply for his disgraceful conduct and for the testimony he gave before the 
Commission, which it describes in its report ‘highly irregular.’46   The Public Service 
Commission (PSC) subsequently recommended that Simelane face a disciplinary 
hearing.47 The PSC’s recommendation was supported by the former Minister of 
Justice, Enver Surty, but controversially withdrawn in November 2009 through  the 
intervention of the then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Jeff 
Radebe and President Zuma. The latter and Radebe deliberately and conveniently 
                                                          
45 Wolf (2011:76). 
46 Ginwala Commission of Enquiry, para 43.2.  
47 Redpath (2012:17). 
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ignored all the concerns raised both in the media and by opposition parties in 
Parliament and went ahead to appoint Simelane as the NDPP.  Clearly, if Zuma was 
looking for a suitable person, as contemplated in the Constitution and the Act, why 
did he appoint as NDPP a person who had been discredited by the Ginwala 
Commission and instead jettison Pikoli who was found by the same commission to 
be a man of integrity, suitable, fit and proper to hold the office of the NDPP?      
 
Simelane’s appointment was eventually nullified by the SCA in 2011in whose 
judgment both President Zuma and Minister Radebe were harshly criticised for 
mishandling Simelane’s appointment. 48  However, at the time he was dismissed, 
Simelane had already done more damage to the NPA than good.  For instance, 
during his tenure he forced Hofmeyr, ‘[o]ne of the country's most powerful corruption 
fighters’ to quit one of the two jobs he occupied as head of both the Asset Forfeiture 
Unit (AFU) and the Special Investigations Unit (SIU).49  He also questionable 
redeployed prosecutors Andre Lamprecht (Chief State Prosecutor of the West Rand 
to the lower court)50, Mutuwa Nengovhela (Deputy Director at the Johannesburg 
High Court and now moved to the family court)51, Retha Meintjies (chief state 
prosecutor to the family court) and George Baloyi52 (chief state prosecutor to the 
                                                          
48 See DA v President of South Africa (263/11) [2011] ZASCA 241 (1 December 2011). 
49 N Davids  and P Nombembe  `Simelane guns for crime buster Hofmeyr’, available at  
    http://mybroadband.co.za/vb/showthread.php/224314-Simelane-guns-for-crimebuster-Hofmeyr   
    (accessed 2 July 2011). 
50 M Mataboge  `Simelane: I helped get Jub Jub bail’ available at 
    http://mg.co.za/article/2010-04-01-    simelane-i-helped-get-jub-bail (accessed 2 July 2011). 
51 Mail & Guardian Staff Reporter, `NPA defends the reshuffling of prosecutors’ available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2010-03-30-npa-defends-reshuffling-of-prosecutors (accessed 2 July 2011). 
52 Lamprecht, Baloyi and Pretoria High Court advocate Retha Meintjies have since challenged their  
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family court). He further demoted Andre Loubser53 from the position of chief 
prosecutor for the northern KZN to that of a normal prosecutor in the 
Pietermaritzburg Magistrates' Court.54 He blocked Hofmeyr’s AFU from implementing 
a preservation order to freeze £437 594 (pounds sterling) in one overseas bank 
account of Fana Hlongwane, known for his association with the arms deal mentioned 
above.55 
 
In 2011 Zuma appointed Nomngcobo Jiba as an Acting NDPP to succeed Simelane. 
As in the case of Simelane, Jiba was appointed despite the damning allegations 
against her to the effect that she had misused her powers in an attempt to 
undermine the corruption investigation of the former police commissioner, Jackie 
Selebi.56 Jiba was suspended for her conduct but later reinstated after charges 
against her were withdrawn for unknown reasons.57 The charges against her were 
withdrawn after she allegedly ‘made representations to Minister Radebe.’58 Neither 
the Constitution nor the Act allows the Minister of Justice to take representations 
from any person being investigated by the NPA for crime. For Radebe to administer 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    redeployment through the union. See N Davids  and P Nombembe  `Simelane guns for crime   
    buster Hofmeyr.’ Sunday Times 4 April 2010. 
53 Loubser died of heart attack just days after he had been demoted. See Broughton T `Demoted’ 
Prosecutor dies suddenly’ available at http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/demoted-prosecutor-
dies-suddenly-1.479155#.Uw5XsvBWHIU (accessed 2 July 2011). 
54 See Davids  and Nombembe  (2010).  
55 Davids  and Nombembe (2010).  
56 Tamukamoyo and Mofana `A Justice system let down’ City Press 28 May 2013 31.  
57 Tamukamoyo and Mofana (2013). 
58 A Basson ‘The ties that bond’ City Press 2 June 2013 31. 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
this illegal act clearly contravened section 22(2) (c) of the Act that provides that only 
the NDPP can receive such representations from the person being investigated and 
affected by such investigation in the process of reviewing a decision whether or not 
to prosecute.59  But neither Radebe nor Jiba were prosecuted for this breach. 
Instead, charges against Jiba were withdrawn.   
 
The negative impact of this manoeuvring by the Minister on the NPA is clearly 
reflected on Jiba’s dismal performance during her tenure as an Acting NDPP. It was 
Jiba who suspended the Cape Town public prosecutor, Brytenbach, and subjected 
her to a malicious disciplinary hearing for, inter alia, pursuing the prosecution of 
Richard Mdluli, Head of Police Crime and Intelligence. Jiba also withdrew charges 
against provincial legislature Speaker, Peggy Nkonyeni and Economic Development 
MEC, Mike Mabuyakhulu.60 She defied the SCA and South Gauteng High Court61 
orders to hand over the transcript of the spy tapes linked to the arms deal to the 
                                                          
59 Sec 22, Powers, duties and functions of National Director (2) In accordance with Sec 179 of the 
Constitution, (c) the National Director-may review a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, after 
consulting the relevant Director and after taking representations, within the period specified by the 
National Director, of the accused person, the complainant and any other person or party whom the 
National Director considers to be relevant. 
60 SAPA `Mkhize remains mum on charge withdrawal in Intaka case’ available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-18-mkhize-remains-mum-on-charge-withrawal-in-intaka-case  
(accessed 29 July 2013). 
61 DA wants Jiba held in contempt for failing to hand over Zuma spy tapes, available at 
http://www.citypress.co.za/politics/da-wants-jiba-held-in-contempt-for-failing-to-hand-over-zuma-
spy-tapes/ available at (accessed 20 June 2013). 
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opposition party, the Democratic Alliance.62  Under her leadership the NPA has lost a 
number of high profile cases in which judges and magistrates were critical about the 
ill-preparedness of the prosecution.63 This is partly because inexperienced 
prosecutors were assigned to handle complex cases at the expense of the 
experienced ones. During Simelane’s tenure as NDPP the morale in the NPA was 
alarmingly low.64 The lack of moral also had the effect of reducing the conviction 
rates during Simelane’s incumbency.65 
 
When the SCA nullified Simelane’s appointment, the then Minister Radebe, 
approached the Constitutional Court in an attempt to keep him in his position. He 
and Simelane contended that the provision in the NPA Act requiring the appointment 
of ‘a fit and proper person, with due regard to his or her experience, 
conscientiousness and integrity’ as NDPP, is not an objective standard and affords 
the President a wide discretion to decide for himself whether an appointee is fit and 
proper or not. This contention was flatly rejected by the Constitutional Court. In 
another case, Mpshe who, in 2009, withdrew all the corruption charges against 
                                                          
62 DA wants Jiba held in contempt for failing to hand over Zuma spy tapes, available at 
http://www.citypress.co.za/politics/da-wants-jiba-held-in-contempt-for-failing-to-hand-over-zuma-
spy-tapes/ (accessed 20 June 2013). 
63 Bulelani Ngcuka `Spy tapes: NPA boss lied’ Sunday Times 5 October 2014 1. See also 
Brytenbach: Nxasane is being targeted. 
64 S Pityana `Liberate public prosecution from politics’ Sunday Times July 14 2013 21. 
65 Mail & Guardian `Jiba: NPA is above politics’ SAPA available at http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-20-
jiba-npa-is-above-politics (accessed 25 January 2013) and Evans S, `NPA loses high profile 
case….against itself’ available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-05-28-00-npa-comes-under-attack 
(accessed 25 January 2013).  
 
 
 
 
62 
 
Zuma, was rewarded with a high position in the criminal justice system when he was 
appointed  acting judge in the North West High Court.  
 
All the power abuses discussed above are the direct consequences of the provisions 
of section 179 (a), empowers the president and the executive to appoint and remove 
the NDPP and other prosecutors from office. And as highlighted above, this section 
seems to have, more often than not, been used coincidentally to weaken rather than 
strengthen the independence of the NPA. Since Pikoli’s dismissal the NPA has been 
unable to recover from the perception that it is politically manipulatable.  So far, 
Zuma has consistently appointed as NDPP persons with questionable backgrounds, 
which has served only to tarnish the image of the NPA even more.66  
 
The damage that political meddling in the workings of the prosecution service has 
caused is documented in various scholarly articles and commentaries.67 And since 
                                                          
66 See also P De Vos `No one is above the law’, who wrote at the time that ‘an editorial in Business   
    Day this morning notes that President Jacob Zuma has acted consistently” to draw around him an   
    iron ring of men he relies on to keep him safe. South Africa and its interests are not part of this   
    particular calculation. The fact that the fraud and corruption charges against him, expediently  
   dropped before the last general election, could quite easily be resuscitated is at the center of 
everything he does.’ Part of this pattern was the appointment, early in his tenure as President, of 
Adv. Menzi Simelane as NDPP. The abolition of the Scorpions and the creation of the far less 
independent Hawks can similarly be seen as an attempt to protect the President from future 
prosecution for taking a bribe from fraudster Shabir Shaik.    
67 See for instance, `Brytenbach’s return spells trouble to Zuma’s NPA cohorts’ Mail & Guardian 31 
May to 6 June  2013 2; A Saba , C Du Plessis and P Harper `It started with Vusi’  City Press 2 June 
2013 4; Basson (2013).S Sole  `Jacob Zuma's decade of destruction’ Mail & Guardian available at  
http://mg.co.za/print/2012-11-02-00-jacob-zumas-decade-of-destruction (accessed 2 June 2013); ` 
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the public does not have the collective courage and means to challenge these 
abuses of power by the President and the executive the few individuals and 
organisations such as the Council for the Advancement of the South African 
Constitution (CASAC), Democratic Alliance (DA), Freedom Under Law (FUL) and 
Hugh Glenister, who is currently championing this cause, may not always be there or 
in a position to intervene through court challenges to preserve the constitution and 
uphold the rule of law.68    
 
It was on account of the threat posed by political machinations to the independence 
of the Chapter institutions, that a committee headed by former Minister Kader Asmal 
urged reform of the mechanism for appointing the members of these independent 
bodies.69 And as a result of one of the recommendations made, the then Minister 
Radebe tabled proposals in Parliament in 2013 to grant the NPA financial autonomy 
from the department of justice, which is a step in the right direction.70     
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Editorial: Justice meddling simply criminal’ Mail & Guardian available at http://mg.co.za/print/2013-
05-24-00-editorial-justice-meddling-simply-criminal (accessed 2 June 2013). See also M 
Moshoeshoe ‘NPA denting justice system's credibility’ available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/npa-denting-justice-system-s-credibility-
1.1493860#.UZ5VgpYaLIU (accessed 20 April 2013); Serjeant at the Bar `NPA's defiance shows 
institutional disrespect for law’ available at http://mg.co.za/print/2012-11-09-00-npas-defiance-
shows-institutional-disrespect-for-law (accessed 17 January 2013) and SAPA `Radebe `satisfied' 
the NPA is doing a good job’ found at http://mg.co.za/print/2013-05-29-radebe-full-jails-a-sign-the-
npa-is-working (accessed 23 April 2013).  
68 DA v President of South Africa (263/11) [2011] ZASCA 241 (1 December 2011). 
69 Pityana (2013:21). 
70 Pityana (2013:21). 
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3.4 Presidential abuse of appointing powers 
 
 
In its 15 years of existence the NPA has had five NDPPs and three acting DPPs. In 
July 2015 President Zuma appointed the fifth NDPP, Shawn Abrahams. This high 
fluctuation of key personnel in the NPA is worrying, for it undermines the effective 
administration of justice by eroding the predictability of the criminal process. Redpath 
interprets the high personnel turnover as a symptom of how the NPA has become 
embroiled in political events which, in turn, affects its independence in the eyes of 
the public.71  It shows, too, that the security of tenure provided for in the Act is not 
enough to safeguard the independence of the NDPP and other high functionaries 
within the NPA., De Vos, cited in Bauer argues that, ‘[w]here a person is not 
appointed for a fixed term they may be perceived as [being unprotected] and would 
make decisions to secure the permanent job instead of making decisions without 
fear, favour or prejudice.’72 The fact of the matter is that anyone who acts in a 
position does not enjoy the same protection as a confirmed NDPP. Someone who 
acts in such a position is more vulnerable to political pressures and manipulation as 
he or she can be removed at any time without following the stringent procedure 
prescribed in the NPA Act. The government that is willing and committed to respect 
and safeguard the independence of the NPA as required by the Constitution would 
avoid removing its NDPP without valid legal reasons. 
 
The delay in appointing a permanent NDPP after Simelane is a striking example of 
how President Zuma placed personal consideration before national interests, 
                                                          
71 Redpath (2012:7).  
72 N Bauer `Jacob Zuma's legal dawdling bodes ill’ found at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-25-00-
jacob-zumas-legal-dawdling (accessed 23 May 2013). 
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notwithstanding the constitutional imperative spelled out in section 237 of the 
Constitution that ‘[a]ll constitutional obligations must be performed diligently and 
without delay.’73 Zuma’s procrastination in appointing a permanent NDPP 
contradicted his justification for rushing the appointment of Simelane whilst the 
litigation between Pikoli and the state was still underway – at a time when Pikoli was 
still legally the NDPP.  Zuma substantiated the need for a speedy appointment on the 
grounds that ‘it was undesirable to continue to have an Acting NDPP performing the 
important functions of the NDPP.’74 But for as long as Jiba, in her acting capacity, 
abused her position to pander to the personal interests of Zuma, he did not perceive 
the need to make a permanent appointment to the office of the NDPP. Indeed, Zuma 
succeeded in buying time to keep Jiba in the post for almost 30 months to the 
detriment of the prosecution services.  
 
3.5 Executive appointment of prosecutors 
 
The executive hand in the control of the NPA does not begin and end with the 
appointment of the NDPP and acting NDPP; it goes further to the appointment of 
senior prosecuting staff. The President and the Minister of Justice make most of the 
appointments. The President appoints up to four deputy NDPPs, after consultation 
with the Minister of Justice and the NDPP. 75  It is these powers that President Zuma 
used to appoint, largely for political considerations, Simelane as the Deputy Director 
in 2010, and few months later, elevate him to the NDPP position. The damage he 
                                                          
73 Sec 237 of the Constitution. 
74 Pikoli v President of the Republic and Others CASE NO: 8550/09 (11/08/2009) (accessed 1  
   January 2012). See also Ngalwa S `Zuma on horns of NPA dilemma.’  
75  Sec 11(1) of the NPA Act.  
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has done to the integrity of the NPA is well documented. And it is widely argued, and 
correctly so, that the reason why the President and his executive side-stepped the 
law in the appointment of Simelane, were the reasons for which he was appointed. 
These reasons were to ensure that the corruption charges against President Zuma 
are not reinstated. He did this by frustrating the DA’s court challenge for the review 
of the NPA decision to withdraw charges against him (Zuma).76 And indeed, 
Simelane did well in this regard when he, among other things, blocked the AFU from 
attaching Hlongwane’s assets, which had the effect of shielding the links of Zuma 
and a few other ANC leaders to the arms deal corruption. This is a clear abuse of 
power and it serves no other purpose than to erode the independence of the NPA, 
ensure it operates with prejudice, with fear and in favour of narrow personal and 
political interests.  
 
This abuse of NPA for political expediency is continued under the leadership of Jiba. 
Her suspension of Advocate Brytenbach, the regional head of the Specialised 
Commercial Crimes Unit (SCCU), is an undisputable example. Brytenbach was 
suspended on 30 April 2012 after she submitted memorandum to the Acting NDPP, 
Jiba, motivating for the reinstatement of charges against Mdluli.77 This was after her 
first efforts to prosecute Mdluli were thwarted by Lawrence Mrwebi78, the national 
                                                          
76 `Brytenbach’s return spells trouble to Zuma’s NPA cohorts’ Mail & Guardian 31 May to 6 June 
2013 and Basson (2013:31). 
77 Basson (2013:31). 
78 Now suspended and being tried by the Gauteng High Court for, among other things, fraud and 
    alleged murder in 1999 of his former lover Ramogibe’s boyfriend. See Mdluli in court again for fraud  
    charges available at http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Mdluli-in-court-again-for-
fraudcharges-20141007 (accessed 13 October 2014). 
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head of the SCCU. But the NPA, in justifying her suspension, spuriously accused her 
of, inter alia, showing bias towards Kumba Iron Ore in the Imperial Crown Trading79 / 
Sishen mining rights case in Kimberley.80 Brytenbach consistently argued that ‘there 
was gross abuse of power in pursuit of political interests and thereby undermining 
the very principle that underpins prosecutorial independence – to prosecute without 
fear, favour or prejudice.’81  She maintained her innocence and claimed she was 
being hit by trumped-up charges to district her from prosecution of President Zuma’s 
friend, Richard Mdluli.82 Brytenbach’s legal team stated in their final heads of 
arguments that ‘[t]his is not an ordinary disciplinary enquiry. It concerns a conflict 
between a prosecutor who has acted with integrity and courage in the performance 
of her functions without fear, favour or prejudice, and some of her superiors bent on 
subverting the rule of law by protecting a senior police officer from prosecution. It 
therefore also concerns the public interest in the vindication of the rule of law.83 
 
Despite the NPA’s counterfeit claim, Brytenbach has, after more than a year, been 
cleared of all the 15 charges levelled against her. Advocate Selby Mbenenge, the 
                                                          
79 The Imperial Crown Trading had close ties with then-president Kgalema Motlanthe's partner, Gugu  
    Mtshali, who was later joined by Atul and Ajay Gupta and President Jacob Zuma's son Duduzane 
as shareholders. See S Evans `Brytenbach disciplinary hearing digs up mine dirt’, available at 
http://mg.co.za/print/2013-01-18-00-Brytenbach-disciplinary-hearing-digs-up-mine-dirt (accessed 2 
June 2013). 
80  M Wiener `Analysis: After NPA's epic loss, Glynnis Brytenbach must return to ALL her cases’ 
found at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-05-28-analysis-after-npas-epic-loss-glynnis-
Brytenbach-must-return-to-all-her-cases/#.Uash3JYaLIU (accessed 2 June 2013).  
81  Wiener (2013). 
82 Wiener (2013).  
83 Wiener (2013) (own emphasis). 
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NPA-appointed chairperson of the disciplinary hearing, found that ‘[i]n all these 
circumstances, the guilt of the employee on this plethora of charges has not been 
proven.’ According to Trengrove SC, Brytenbach’s lawyer, Brytenbach’s victory ‘was 
so important for Glynnis personally and so important for the preservation of the rule 
of law.’84 Mike Hellens SC’s reaction was that he ‘would hope that the judgment in 
this matter would be the turning point and the beginning of the restoration on behalf 
of the public in confidence in the objectivity of the criminal justice system and the 
NPA.’ Putting it differently, ‘had it gone the other way and permanently remained so, 
it would have been a very, very sad day for the public’s expectation of objective 
justice at the hands of the National Prosecuting Authority.’85 
 
Brytenbach’s revelation during the hearing that there is abuse of power and political 
interference in the NPA has badly dented the country's criminal justice system in the 
opinion of the public. Despite the fact that Mbenenge did not make a direct finding on 
these claims, Brytenbach’s victory in this hearing give credence to this claim. 
Wiener86 analysed this situation as follows: 
 
`The faith of the people is in doubt and as Lord Chief Justice Gordon Hewart said from 
the King’s Bench in Rex v. Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy in 1924, “Not only must 
                                                          
84 `An interview with Wim Trengrove’ Sunday Times 2 June 2013 12. 
85 Mike Hellens SC was central to the complaint laid against Brytenbach and also acted for Kumba 
Iron Ore in the ICT / Sishen matter.  He was accused during the hearing of having an improper 
relationship with Brytenbach, the allegation both of them denied. See Wiener M `Analysis: After 
NPA's epic loss, Glynnis Brytenbach must return to ALL her cases.’ 
86 Wiener is an Eyewitness News reporter. She has been following Glynnis Brytenbach’s case since 
she was suspended in 2012 and co-authored “My Second Initiation” book with Pikoli which was 
launched in October 2013.  
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justice be done; it must also be seen to be done.” It is a firm precedent in law that the 
mere appearance of bias is sufficient to overturn a decision.’87 
 
The President may also, through proclamation in the Gazette, appoint special 
directors of public prosecutions with specific mandates to exercise certain powers, 
carry out certain duties and perform certain functions conferred or imposed on or 
assigned to them by the President in the proclamation.88 The Minister of Justice 
appoints provincial deputy directors of public prosecutions after consultation with the 
NDPP. 89 Some of the deputy directors are appointed, in terms of section 15 (1) (a), 
to serve as provincial directors of public prosecutions.90 As with the NDPP, the 
remuneration and terms and conditions of service of the deputy national directors 
and the provincial directors are determined by the President.91 The Minister of 
Justice also appoints, based on the recommendations of the NDPP, ordinary 
prosecutors.92  
 
This is an unhealthy environment for any NDPP entrusted with the responsibilities 
attached to the office of the NDPP. To achieve such responsibilities one needs, 
among others, a supportive team of prosecutors bound together by a common vision 
and mission for a common goal, of carrying out the prosecution function on behalf of 
the State independently and without fear, favour or prejudice subject only to the 
constitution and the law. This is not possible where such prosecutors are appointed 
                                                          
87 Wiener M `Analysis’. 
88 Sec 13(1)(c) of the NPA Act. 
89 Sec 15(1) of the NPA Act. 
90 Sec 15(1)(a) of the NPA Act. 
91 Sec 16(1) to (3) of the NPA Act.  
92 See Sec 16(1) to (3) of the NPA Act.  
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by the Minister and the President for, among other objectives, hidden in the ‘specific 
mandates.’ Such a process often produces a warehouse of individual prosecutors 
who may not form a `team’ required in achieving the NPA mandate and objectives 
because they do not have common mandates and therefore do not share a common 
vision and mission required of them to assist the national director to achieve 
common goals.  
 
It can safely be argued that it was as a result of this state of affairs that, McCarthy, in 
light of Powell’s revelation, went astray to commission the compilation of and co-
authored the Browse Mole Report93 without Pikoli’s permission. This report, inter alia, 
left much causality within the ANC and the Alliance. It has also, partly, cost Pikoli a 
job. His removal from the position of the NDPP also shook the government and 
indirectly caused some degree of instability in the country when former President 
Mbeki was recalled94, as a result.  It also allowed Hofmeyr a passage to actively get 
involved in seeking a political solution for Zuma’s legal problems without permission 
from Mpshe and against the oath of his office, the constitution and the law to which 
he is accountable. As it is known, Hofmeyr was not punished despite this being a 
serious offence in terms of the NPA Act.  And he still remains in his job as the head 
of the AFU. And as Ginwala Commission concluded, the fact that McCarthy was 
                                                          
93 V Pikoli and M Wiener My Second Initiation (Pan Macmillan South Africa 2013) 205. The Browse 
Mole Report was compiled by Ivor Powell, the former investigator, who was commissioned to do so 
in 2006 by the former head of the Directorate of Special Operations, Leonard McCarthy. McCarthy, 
who co-authored this report, is currently the vice President for Integrity at the World Bank. See Mail 
& Guardian Online, `Smoke and Mirrors’ 1 May 2009 available at http://mg.co.za/article/2009-05-
01-smoke-and-mirrorsc (accessed 3 July 2011). 
94 See F Chikane Eight Days in September (Picador Africa 2012).  
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appointed by the President, it meant that legally Pikoli had no authority over him and 
therefore could not have disciplined him.95 The same principle applies to Hofmeyr, 
whom Mpshe could not discipline for engaging in the political project of seeking a 
political solution for Zuma. This state of affairs borders on selective prosecution and 
strengthens the allegations that the NPA’s independent is a fiction since, in reality; it 
bows to executive and political manipulation.  
 
On the contrary, this is possible not only where the NDPP plays an active role in 
appointing prosecutors, but rather where, most importantly, the President and the 
executive in general, play a lessor role in the process. The President and the 
executive’s role in this process was supposed to begin and end with the appointment 
of an independent body such as the Judicial Services Commission which is 
empowered to facilitate the appointment of the NDPP and prosecutors on behalf of 
the state and not in the actual  appointment of prosecutors and senior officials.  
 
3.6 The office tenure of the NDPP 
 
 
The NDPP is appointed for a non-renewable period of 10 years, and the provincial 
directors of public prosecution for life – that is until they attain the retirement age of 
                                                          
95  Although Ginwala at the same time opined that despite this legal position, Pikoli could have still 
reigned on McCarthy and stopped him from engaging intelligence information gathering exercise, 
she went on to say: ‘It is my view that despite lacking the authority to formally discipline the head of 
the DSO, it was open to him to reprimand the head of the DSO for conducting the Browse 
investigation and preparing an intelligence report beyond the mandate of the DSO, ….The head of 
the DSO would then have had an opportunity, if he had a defence for the conduct, to raise such a 
defence or justification.’ See Ginwala Commission Report para 185.    
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65.96 The NDPP’s 10-year term of office is designed to insulate the incumbent from 
arbitrary removal by whoever becomes president of the country. But this protective 
measure has proven to be inadequate, for in the space of 15 years there have been 
eight leaders of the NPA. The dubious basis on which Pikoli was removed from office 
underscores the insufficiency of the constitutional and statutory regime governing the 
security of tenure of an incumbent NDPP, especially one who shows himself able to 
‘undertake politically difficult prosecutions that have a basis in law.’97 This  
exceptional high fluctuation points not only to the insecurity associated with holding 
of  office, but even more troubling, it contributes to destabilising the prosecution 
service and demoralising the ordinary public prosecutors who like to have certainty 
about their own positions.98   
 
3.7 Abuse of power by the NDPP 
 
 
The NDPP has the final say on whether or not to institute a prosecution and may 
review a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute taken by the other directors, but 
after consulting with the director concerned.99  The phrase ‘after consultation’ means 
that, while the NDPP is obligated to consult with a provincial DPP, he or she need 
not obtain the consensus of the DPP before acting. This means the NDPP is 
responsible for the ultimate decision.100  
 
                                                          
96 Sec 14(1) of the NPA Act.   
97 Redpath (2012:13-14).  
98 See Redpath (2012:7).  
99 Sec 22 (c) of the NPA Act. 
100 Redpath (2012: iv).  
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3.7.1. Examples where NDPPs abused their powers 
 
3.7.1.1. Ngcuka’s decision in the Zuma case 
In August 2003 the first NDPP, Ngcuka, decided not to prosecute Zuma together 
with his financial adviser, Shaik, despite the recommendation of the investigation 
team that the two be prosecuted together for corruption.101 Ngcuka’s reason was 
that, while there was a prima facie case against Zuma, the prospects of success 
were not strong enough. 102  In his affidavit, Ngcuka stated that ‘[t]he irony is that, far 
from abusing my powers in order to harm Zuma’s reputation, I did everything within 
my powers to protect it. The extraordinary lengths to which the NPA went, on my 
instructions, to avoid the investigation entering the public arena are set out in my 
press release of 23 August 2003.’103   
 
The question that arises is whether Ngcuka would have been as cautious if the 
person involved was not Zuma, the deputy president of the ANC. And would the 
Minister of Justice have appeared together with Ngcuka when this decision was 
made public on television had it been a decision in respect of someone else other 
than Zuma? The answer is ‘no’.  
 
When Ngcuka realised that the charge sheet presented to him by prosecutors was 
drawn up to charge both Shaik and Zuma, he allegedly responded that: ‘I will charge 
the deputy president only if my president agrees.’ This allegation is attributed to a 
former senior ANC official and Parliamentarian, Feinstein, who alludes to 
                                                          
101 Feinstein After The Party (Verso 2007) at 173, 217 and 230. 
102 Ngcuka’s supporting affidavit in State v Zuma and Others. 
103 Ngcuka para 8. 
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conversations with prosecutors, where they indicated that a ‘shadowy financier’ close 
to Mbeki and Zuma who played an on-going role in financing the ANC ‘was off limits’ 
and that he could be prosecuted too.104 Pikoli’s view on this matter suggests that 
Ngcuka operated under some political pressure to which statements like this and the 
August 2003 controversial decision could safely be attributed.105 The appearance of 
a lack of independence or bias by the NDPP, who holds the final say over all 
prosecutions, is perhaps just as damaging to the office and to criminal justice as the 
real existence of a lack of independence or bias.106 Ngcuka’s decision in this matter 
was the most controversial of his tenure and was regarded as politically motivated.107 
 
3.7.1.2 Mpshe’s’ withdrawal of the charges against Zuma 
In 2009, Pikoli’s successor, Mpshe, dropped all the charges against Zuma while the 
investigating team advised him not to do so.108  The investigation and prosecution 
team in this case advised that the Zuma case be continued in order to allow the court 
                                                          
104 See Feinstein (2007:173, 217 and 230). 
105 See Pikoli and Wiener (2013).  
106 However, despite these concerns, during his tenure, high profile and struggle icon Alan Boesak  
     was charged and found guilty of fraud committed during the apartheid years (which he justified as  
     ‘struggle accounting’) in March 1999. Prosecutions of two senior ANC politicians, MP Winnie  
     Madikizela-Mandela and party chief whip Tony Yengeni, both culminated in 2003, also under     
 
     Ngcuka’s tenure. And Looking at the performance of the NPA more broadly during Ngcuka’s     
     tenure, the number of cases prosecuted with a verdict achieved in 2003, at the peak of Ngcuka’s  
     tenure, has yet to be matched subsequently (see chapter 2). Although Ngcuka served for only six      
     years, he remains the longest-serving NDPP South Africa has yet had. See Redpath (2012:11-13). 
107 Redpath (2012:11-12). 
108 FUL v NDPP and Others (CASE NO. 26912/12) para 111.  
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to decide on the legality and implication of the tapes.109 The investigating team, also 
known as the ‘Bumiputera team’ led by senior state advocate,  Billy Downer, further 
indicated in their recommendations to Mpshe that: 
 
`[t]he form of these representations is extremely unfortunate and it places us in an 
invidious position. We are unable to appraise properly the merits of these 
representations. They should be reduced to writing under oath and presented in the 
normal course, if Zuma wishes to continue to rely on them. Unless this is done, they 
amount to little more than blackmail. We should be given an opportunity after this is 
done to evaluate the allegations properly in the usual way by consulting all the parties 
allegedly involved and gathering whatever evidence there is to the contrary. Only in 
this way can the merits of these representations be determined, if necessary also after 
obtaining senior counsel’s advice. The allegations are simply too serious to be avoided 
other than by proper investigation, even if the results are damaging to previous NDPPs 
or any other NPA personnel. Furthermore, in light of the Zuma camp’s track record of 
making unfounded allegations, presenting distorted versions of the truth and even 
manufacturing blatantly false allegations and “evidence” to advance their cause, these 
allegation must be treated with a healthy dose of scepticism.’110 
 
They then recommended that Mpshe decline all representations in this case and that 
the matter be decided by a court of law, and not in a non-judicial way, behind the 
scenes, and away from the public.111  But Mpshe did not heed this advice. Instead he 
used his power to veto the decision of his deputies and made the controversial 
decision to withdraw all the charges against Zuma.  
 
Mpshe’ predecessor, Pikoli, said that this was a bad legal decision because the 
alleged conspirators ‘were not conspiring to manufacture evidence against Zuma.’112 
                                                          
109 A Basson 'The NPA is very upset about it.’ 
110 FUL v NDPP and Others (CASE NO. 26912/12) para 111.  
111 npacorrespondencekeyexcerptslongversion available at 
http://cdn.mg.co.za/content/documents/2013/08/29/npacorrespondencekeyexcerptslongversion.pdf 
(accessed 23 September 2013). 
112 Pikoli V and Wiener M (2013) at 160. 
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He maintains that ‘Mpshe was put under political pressure.’113 He argues that this 
was a political solution using legal decision to justify it.114 This is in clear breach of 
the principle of legality. Unfortunately, according to Pilkoli, Mpshe used ‘a legal 
decision not really applicable to this case and which was overturned on appeal.’115  
This was a desperate time for both Mpshe and Zuma and required desperate 
measures. Zuma was on the verge of becoming the next president of the country 
and this would have been impossible had the charges against been pursued. 
Therefore, a political solution to legal problems had to be found, and very quickly so. 
Mpshe did not, as it was expected of him, apply his mind to the matter. He simply 
resorted to whatever reason he could find under case law to justify the political 
solution imposed on him by his political masters, thus embarrassing himself and the 
NPA.  
 
However, as the charges against Zuma were withdrawn, he is not entitled to an 
acquittal, for the charges could be resuscitated again at a later stage. This is 
different to a stopping of the prosecution, which leads to the acquittal of the 
accused.116 It is in accordance with this legal position that the DA is pursuing the re-
instatement of charges against Zuma.  
                                                          
113 Pikoli V and Wiener M (2013) at 161.  
114 Pikoli V and Wiener M (2013) at 161.  
115 Pikoli V and Wiener M (2013) at 161.  
116 Section 6(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act (Act 51 of 1997) states that: (b) at any time after an 
accused has pleaded, but before conviction, stop the prosecution in respect of that charge, in 
which event the court trying the accused shall acquit the accused in respect of that charge: 
Provided that where a prosecution is conducted by a person other than an attorney-general or a 
body or person referred to in section 8, the prosecution shall not be stopped unless the attorney-
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The other worrying aspect of Mpshe’s decision is that it disobeyed a binding decision 
of the SCA in contravention of section 165(5) of the Constitution.117 This provision 
states that a court decision binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which it 
applies.118 In the similar vein, Wolf is concerned that the prosecuting authority and 
the presiding judge in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court did not query the legality of the 
prosecuting authority’s power to enter a nolle prosequi where there is a prima facie 
case.119 While these are genuine legal questions that worryingly remain unanswered, 
the reasons for the court not to have queried the legality of the NPA’s decision seem 
very clear.  First, whether legal or not, the NPA’s decision to withdraw charges 
against Zuma remains a prosecutorial function with which, in terms of section 32 (1) 
(b) of the NPA Act, no one, including the court, has right to interfere. Secondly, there 
was no application before the court that invited the presiding judge to make such a 
pronouncement. It would have therefore been improper and irregular for the court to 
do so. In NDPP v Zuma, the SCA, per Harms DP, strongly criticised Nicholson J of 
the Kwa-Zulu Natal High Court, the court a quo, for making adverse pronouncements 
on matters that were not before the court. It ruled that ‘judgment by ambush is not 
permitted.’120 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
general or any person authorized thereto by the attorney-general, whether in general or in any 
particular case, has consented thereto.’ 
117 Wolf (2011:89).  
118 Constitution, Sec 165(5). 
119 Wolf (2011:86).  
120 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma (573/08) [2009] ZASCA 1 (12 Jan 2009) para 47. 
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3.7.1.3 Simelane stops seizure of assets in Hlongwane case 
In 2011, the then acting NDPP, Simelane, stopped attempts by the  Assets Forfeiture 
Unit (AFU) to freeze the foreign assets of businessman Fana Hlongwane as part of 
the arms deal investigation. Simelane did so against the AFU’s belief that there was 
good reason to suspect that the R200 million Hlongwana received from successful 
arms deal bidders was paid as bribes, hence the decision to proceed with his 
prosecution. In justifying this decision, Simelane correctly argued that for the NPA to 
institute a forfeiture process it would require a solid basis rather than a simple 
suspicion. But whether or not there was indeed no basis to execute the attachment 
of asserts order is questionable. Furthermore, such a test, however, is less than the 
criminal test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It is a civil test of a balance of 
probabilities. As De Vos observed:  
 
‘But curiously, he then applies this test in a rather eccentric manner, arguing that 
because the test is one of probabilities Hlongwane needed: to show on a balance of 
probabilities that the money was not obtained from criminal activities. Put another way, 
they needed to rebut the suspicion of criminal activity. They did not have to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the money was obtained legally. For this purpose they 
were advised to submit a formal memorandum supported by annexures, if any.’121  
 
 
De Vos goes on to argue that merely because Hlongwane provided a story that casts 
doubt on the version presented by the AFU does not mean that on a balance of 
probabilities Hlongwana was not involved in corruption. On balance, one has to 
decide which version is more plausible, not whether the AFU has a watertight 
case.122  
                                                          
121 De Vos `Simelane comes through for the ANC’, available at       
http://www.bing.com/search?q=Piere%20De%20Vos%20on%20fana%20hlongwana&FORM=WLE
TLB&PC=WLEM&QS=n (accessed 23 March 2010). 
122 De Vos (2010). 
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Just like with the withdrawal of the corruption charges against Zuma, this case could 
have been subjected to a court of law to make a judicial pronouncement, but it was 
not. This conduct constituted a clear abuse of power by the NDPP and raised in the 
public mind the suspicion that the NPA is after all not independent, particularly when 
the accused is politically connected.  
 
3.7.1.4 The withdrawal of charges in the ‘amigos’ case 
A further example of the abuse of the NDPP’s powers was the failure to lay charges 
against the former Premier of Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN), Zweli Mkhize, and the 
withdrawal of charges against former Speaker of the KZN provincial legislature, 
Peggy Nkonyeni and KZN provincial Minister for Economic Development, Mike 
Mabuyakhulu. The fact that these individuals are apparently connected to Zuma 
raises serious concerns123. The three high profile ANC politicians in KZN were 
involved what came to be known in the media circle as the ‘amigos case or the 
‘Intaka case.’124 The ‘amigos case’ is a corruption matter involving Uruguayan 
businessman Gaston Savoi. Savoi's company, Intaka, allegedly paid bribes to 
ensure that a contract to supply water purifiers and oxygen generators to hospitals, 
at hugely inflated prices, was awarded to him.125 Also implicated is the former 
provincial treasury boss, Sipho Shabalala, who allegedly received a R1-million 
                                                          
123 Staff Reporter `Zuma man who cleared Mdluli reviews KZN speaker's case’, available at  
      http://mg.co.za/print/2012-04-19-anc-politicians-corruption-case-in-doubt  (accessed 21 January  
     2013). See also S Pityana `Liberate public prosecution from politics’ Sunday Times 14 July 2013   
     21. 
124 Cronje (2012).  
125 Cronje (2012). 
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donation for the ANC.126 What is more worrying is that the charges against Nkonyeni 
and Mabuyakhulu were withdrawn by  Moipone Noko who was then Acting Provincial 
Director of Prosecutions in KZN. She was appointed in July 2012 after the then Kwa-
Zulu-Natal's Acting Head of Public Prosecutions, Simphiwe Mlotshwa, was ousted, 
reportedly for refusing to withdraw the charges against the two politicians. Noko has 
now been elevated to the position of permanent DPP of Kwa-Zulu Natal.127  
 
Another prosecutor who was intrinsically involved in the withdrawal of charges 
against the two politicians was Lawrence Mrwebi, the then head of NPA’s 
commercial crimes unit in KZN. It had long been reported in the media that Mrwebi, 
who was appointed in this position by President Zuma in November 2012, had to, as 
his first assignment, withdraw the charges against Mdluli, which he did.128 This was 
then followed by the withdrawal of charges against Nkonyeni and Mabuyakhulu. 
Mrwebi has since emerged as one of Zuma’s ‘praetorian guards.’129 As a result of 
these and many other controversial prosecutorial decisions and activities he has 
been involved in, Mrwebi has fast emerged as a compromised and politically pliable 
prosecutor within the NPA with questionable respect for the Constitution and the law.  
In the case of FUL v NDPP and Others, Mrwebi was exposed as a person who lacks 
integrity, honesty and respect. He lied about having consulted the DPP North 
Gauteng (Mzinyathi), as required by Section 24(3) of the NPA Act130 before 
withdrawing the charges against Mdluli. He also did not follow the law that required 
                                                          
126 Cronje (2012). 
127 Cronje (2012). 
128 FUL v NDPP CASE NO. 26912/12, para 10. 
129 Cronje (2102). 
130 FUL v NDPP and Others para 42. 
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that he consult with the NDPP, Jiba, at the time, yet he purported to have done so. 
These lies were revealed when Jiba, in her affidavit, submitted in the matter of FUL v 
NDPP and Others that: ‘the decisions’ of the Special DPP and the DPP who 
instructed the charges to be withdrawn  were not brought to her attention for 
consideration, implying that she made no decision in relation to the 
representations.131  Mzinyathi, also in a confirmatory affidavit filed on the day before 
the application was enrolled for hearing, refuted that her engagement with Mrwebi on 
5 December 2011, which Mrwebi claims was his consultation with her, was untrue 
and in fact it was a brief encounter in which the issues were not fully canvassed.132 
The unfolding of these events is captured in the judgment as follows:  
    
`After lengthy cross examination by Mr. Trengrove, Mrwebi conceded that when he 
took the final decision, either on 4 December 2011 or 5 December 2011, to withdraw 
the charges and discontinue the prosecution of Mdluli on the fraud and corruption 
charges, he did not know Mzinyathi’s view of the matter and did not have his 
concurrence in the decision. He admitted that he took the decision prior to writing the 
consultative note and did so relying on representations made to him in confidence by 
anonymous people, who he was not prepared to name and whose input he did not 
share with Mzinyathi.  Mzinyathi’s views were conveyed to Mrwebi for the first time in 
an email on 8 December 2011 in response to the consultative note, after Mrwebi had 
already informed Mdluli’s attorney that the charges would be withdrawn.’133  
 
This is a clear breach of the constitution and the law as well as the oath of office that 
Mrwebi took. This is a strong prima facie case of pliable prosecutors who abuse their 
positions for political purposes. Mrwebi’s conduct could only serve to further damage 
public confidence in the NPA, particularly in the face of public disquiet about possible 
political interference in its prosecutorial function in favour of powerful politicians and 
their associates. It is one of the fatal blows to the independence of the NPA, the 
                                                          
131 FUL v NDPP and Others para 36. 
132 FUL v NDPP and Others para 42. 
133 FUL v NDPP and Others para 48. 
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effectiveness of the criminal justice system and the application of the rule of law in 
SA. It is for this, among other reasons that Murphy J was contemptuously scathing of 
Mrwebi in his judgment in the case of FUL v NDPP and Others in the Northern 
Gauteng High Court. In one of his explosive findings he found that Mrwebi gave 
‘implausible’ evidence and ‘probably invented after the fact’ an explanation as to why 
he dropped corruption charges against Richard Mdluli.134 He concluded that all the 
decisions Mrwebi took to withdraw charges against Mdluli were ‘illegal, irrational, 
based on irrelevant considerations and material errors of law, and ultimately so 
unreasonable that no reasonable prosecutor could have taken it.’135 It is doubtful that 
Mrwebi has done all this on account of incompetence on his side, and that he could 
risk his professional career and the NPA without any pressure, manipulation or any 
form of reward.is. Mrwebi was suspended by then NDPP, Mxolisi Nxasana, and 
appeared in the Pretoria Commercial Crime Unit for defeating the ends of justice, 
among other charges.136 Nxasane laid charges against Mrwebi after the SCA ruled 
that Mrwebi acted improperly when taking the decision to withdraw charges against 
former crime intelligence unit head, Richard Mdluli.137  
  
                                                          
134 FUL v NDPP and Others (CASE NO. 26912/12) para 175. 
135 FUL v NDPP and Others (CASE NO. 26912/12) para 176. 
136 ‘Mrwebi summoned to appear in court’ EWN available at 
     http://ewn.co.za/2014/09/04/Hawks-confirm-Mrwebi-to-appear-in-court (accessed 8 October   
     2014).  
137‘Mrwebi summoned to appear in court.’  
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4. The notion of prima facie as a criterion for prosecution 
 
In South African law, where a prima facie case exists, a duty to prosecute arises 
unless a compelling reason exists to decline to prosecute. A prima facie case means 
that the allegations and supporting statements available to the prosecution are of 
such a nature that if proved in a court of law on the basis of admissible evidence, the 
court should convict.138 Under a constitutional order such as the one that pertains in 
South Africa, the exercise of all public power is constrained by the principle of 
legality and the provisions of the Constitution. Yet the NPA has maintained that it has 
an unfettered discretion not to prosecute, which is generally not subject to judicial 
review.139 It concludes that the primary factors affecting the credibility and 
performance of the NPA is the inappropriate exercise of the discretion not to 
prosecute, most powerfully evident in the hands of the NDPP, who has a 
constitutionally-sanctioned power to veto the decisions of prosecutors under him. 
This right to veto has been exercised (or not exercised) with consequences that 
continue to cast doubt on the independence and impartiality of the NPA. This, in turn, 
affects internal staff morale and external public confidence.140 
 
Ngcuka’s 2003 nolle prosequi decision against Zuma, while a prima facie case 
existed, is again a case in point. The chief prosecutor in Zuma's corruption trial, Billy 
Downer, criticised all three consecutive heads of the prosecuting authority for the 
fact that Zuma's case never saw the light of day.141 In terms of the Constitution, 
                                                          
138 Redpath (2012:41).  
139 Redpath (2012: iv).  
140 Redpath (2012: iv).  
141 Wolf (2011:61).  
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prosecutors are obliged to exercise the power to prosecute ‘without fear, favour or 
prejudice.’ This implies pre-trial equal treatment and precludes selective prosecution 
or the dropping of charges in prima facie cases for reasons of political expediency.142 
In the matter of the NDPP and Jacob Zuma143 in which Zuma contested the 
reopening of the case, the SCA distinguished between prima facie evidence that 
would merit the prosecution of an accused and discharging the onus of proof during 
a criminal trial. The court further ruled that the judgment of Nicholson J was 
erroneous insofar as it confused the standards for a prima facie case that merits 
prosecution with the prima facie standard, which is required to discharge the onus of 
proof during a criminal trial. The court held that prima facie evidence does not need 
to be conclusive or irrefutable at the stage when criminal proceedings are instituted. 
It must have enough merit only once the criminal investigations are concluded ‘in the 
sense of reasonable prospects of success.’144 The rationale behind this requirement 
is to prevent the laying of spurious charges against innocent people. Whether or not 
a case would actually be winnable in court is the domain of the judiciary and not the 
prosecutors. That decision depends on the evidence presented to the court under 
cross-examination where the prosecution is required to present prima facie evidence 
of each element of the crime. Only if the prosecution can, during the trial, establish a 
prima facie case which is strong enough to discharge the burden of proof will the 
accused be required to rebut it by raising a reasonable doubt.145 This being the case 
                                                          
142 See Pikoli and Wiener (2013:140).  
143 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma (573/08) [2009] ZASCA 1 (12 Jan 2009) para 31. 
144  Wolf (2011:61). 
145  Wolf (2011:61). 
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it means that Ngcuka’s 2003 nolle prosequi decision offended this established legal 
practice. 
 
5. The implications of the nolle prosequi 
 
During Simelane’s tenure as NDPP, a number of questionable nolle prosequi 
decisions were made by the NPA. This was clearly done in the interest of executive 
and political considerations than for prosecutorial reasons. These nolle prosequi 
decisions related to terminations of prosecutions and forfeitures against the high-
profile and politically-connected people. The decisions were made in a manner that 
‘suggests that the decision not to prosecute is being exercised without due regard to 
the constitutional duty to prosecute.’146  This decision relates, first, to the use of the 
spy tapes to effect a nolle prosequi against Zuma by Mpshe. This offends Section 
32(1)(a) of the NPA Act, which requires members of the prosecuting authority to 
serve ’impartially and exercise, carry out or perform his or her powers, duties and 
functions in good faith and without fear, favour or prejudice and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law.’147 The NPA acted in direct contravention of its 
constitutional powers by offending148 the SCA judgment in the matter of the NDPP 
and Zuma which stated clearly that ‘[a] prosecution is not wrongful merely because it 
is brought for an improper purpose. It will only be wrongful if, in addition, reasonable 
and probable grounds for prosecuting are absent....’149 This decision and deliberate 
                                                          
146 Redpath (2012: 41-42).  
147 NPA Act No.38 of 1998. 
148 In this regard, the NPA undermined the principle of judicial precedent or the doctrine of stare  
     decisis. Under this doctrine a lower court, which includes the NPA, must honour findings of law   
     made by a higher court that is within the appeals path of cases the court hears.  
149 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma (573/08) [2009] ZASCA 1 (12 Jan 2009) para 37. 
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transgression of the law by the NPA suggest prima facie cases of selective criminal 
prosecution at the behest of political considerations which is prohibited by the law. 
The 2010 Code of Conduct of the NPA encourages prosecutors subtly to exercise 
their discretion not to prosecute some cases. Excerpts from Paragraphs C and D of 
the Code read as follows: 
`The prosecutorial discretion to institute and to stop criminal proceedings should be 
exercised independently, in accordance with the Prosecution Policy and the Policy 
Directives, and be free from political, public and judicial interference.  Prosecutors should 
perform their duties fairly, consistently and expeditiously and…give due consideration to 
declining to prosecute, discontinuing criminal proceedings conditionally or unconditionally 
or diverting criminal cases from the formal justice system, particularly those involving 
young persons, with due respect for the rights of suspects and victims, where such action  
is appropriate…in the institution of criminal proceedings, proceed when a case is well-
founded upon evidence reasonably believed to be reliable and admissible, and not 
continue a prosecution in the absence of such evidence.’150 
 
Redpath is of the view that it is partly as a result of this Code of Conduct that the 
’tendency to decline to prosecute is currently the central malaise affecting the 
NPA.’151 The problem is that the decision not to prosecute is fundamentally different 
from the decision to prosecute, precisely because it will not in the normal course be 
tested in court, as would a decision to prosecute. Coupled with this policy directive is 
the attitude of the NPA, conveyed in court documents, that such a decision not to 
prosecute is not ordinarily subject to review in the courts.152 Nolle prosequis in prima 
facie cases are tantamount to non-judicial acquittals.153 
 
                                                          
150  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development No R 1257 of 29 September 2010  
     Code of Conduct for Members of the National Prosecuting Authority under sec 22(6) of the  
      NPA Act, 1998 paras C and D.  
151  Redpath (2012: iv).  
152  Redpath (2012: 41-42).  
153  Wolf (2011:64). 
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As Redpath observed, the then Acting NDPP, Mpshe, in his answering affidavit to 
the application by the DA to have his decision to drop charges against Zuma 
reviewed, corrected and set aside, outlined the NPA’s understanding of whether 
decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute are ever subject to review. Mpshe 
contended that such decisions are only reviewable on very narrow grounds such as 
bad faith (and not broader constitutional and administrative law grounds such as 
rationality). He claimed (without reference to authority) that this is the approach that 
our courts have always adopted in relation to prosecutorial decisions, and it is the 
approach adopted in other jurisdictions. It is indeed correct that for many years prior 
to 1994 the discretionary powers of prosecutors in South Africa were regarded as 
non-justiciable. However, this began to change during the 1980s, with the normal 
standards of review being applied to both prosecutors and Attorneys-Generals.154 
Furthermore, under a constitutional order, the exercise of all public power is 
constrained by the principle of legality and the provisions of the Constitution.155 It is 
on this basis, among others, that the SCA in the matter of the Democratic Alliance 
and National Director of Public Prosecutions ruled that the NPA’s nolle prosequi 
decision was subject to review by the courts.    
 
This state of affairs raises the issue of whether prosecutors should not be more 
accountable to the public. The need for such a requirement arises against the 
background of prosecutors ordinarily making decisions (particularly the decision not 
to prosecute) which sometimes remain unexplained to or misunderstood by the 
ordinary public, which may undermine public confidence in the decisions taken. 
                                                          
154  Redpath (2012: 41-42).  
155  Redpath J (2012: 41-42).  
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Parliament, which is obligated to hold the executive to account, does not inspire 
confidence when it comes to holding the executive to account for leaning on the NPA 
to make decisions that are patently of a political nature. Its reluctance to do so 
encourages the executive to infringe the law without being held accountable.  
 
6. The doctrine of the separation of powers with regard to the NPA 
 
 
The separation of powers implies a distinction between the function of making law 
(performed by the legislature), the function of executing or implementing law in the 
field of executive state administration (performed by the executive), and the function 
of enforcing law through prosecution and adjudication (the administration of justice 
by prosecutors and the judiciary). The idea is that each branch of government must 
have the power and the incentive to guard its own sphere and to counter the abuses 
of the other two.156 It is for this reasons that the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, Michael Masutha, has recently transferred all the administrative 
functions and staff from the Department of Justice and Correctional Services, which 
were also displaced, to the Office of the Chief Justice.157 Based on the above 
analysis, the prosecuting authority cannot logically be construed to be part of the 
executive since the prosecutorial function is not an administrative function; it is a law 
enforcing function.158 
 
                                                          
156 Redpath (2012:70).  
157 Announcement of the transfer of administrative functions and staff from the Department of Justice  
     and Constitutional Development to the Office of the Chief Justice available at    
      http://www.gov.za/speeches/view.php?sid=48890  (accessed 8 October 2014). 
158  Redpath (2012:70).  
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The scope of powers of the judiciary and the prosecutors are clearly delineated in 
the Constitution and the prosecutors may therefore not encroach upon the domain of 
the judiciary by entering, for instance, a nolle prosequi where there is a prima facie 
case.159 This would amount to a non-judicial acquittal, which constitutes a forbidden 
form of exercise of power, as section 41(1) (f) of the Constitution explicitly states that 
no state organ may assume any power except those conferred upon it.160 In other 
words, the scope of the discretionary power to prosecute is limited to those instances 
where there is doubt whether there are not reasonable prospects of success. While 
prosecutors have to consider the quality and the quantity of the evidence that needs 
to be presented to the court for it to find the accused guilty, it is essentially the 
domain of the court to decide whether the accused has been found guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Prosecutors may not encroach on the adjudicative terrain of 
judges.161  
 
The judicial powers relating to the administration of justice are obviously more 
encompassing and not restricted to the enforcement of criminal law only. The 
judiciary has to resolve disputes in all other fields of law as well. The role of the 
NDPP in particular, in terms of the current legal framework ‘inevitably impinges on 
the principle of separation of powers.’162 For instance, Mpshe’s 2009 decision not to 
prosecute Zuma, in particular, clearly illustrates the blurring of the separation of 
powers lines. He could have referred the matter to court for adjudication.  
                                                          
159  Redpath (2012: 41-42).  
160  Sec 41(1)(f) of the Constitution.  
161  Sec 41(g) of the Constitution. 
162  Redpath (2012: 70).  
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                                                        Chapter 5 
General Comments on the Prosecutorial Function in the South African Context 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The NPA’s institutional and structural arrangement within the executive branch of 
government clearly runs an avoidable ‘risk of straddling both the executive and 
judicial spheres.’1 In South Africa, this risk is exacerbated, because the decision to 
prosecute is arguably as important as the ultimate decision of the judiciary (guilty or 
not guilty) in a particular matter. This is because very few reported crimes are 
prosecuted with a verdict, and furthermore, approximately 80% of all crimes which 
are prosecuted result in a conviction. The decision either to prosecute or not is 
therefore a crucial one.2 This chapter reflects on the role of the prosecution service 
in South Africa in the light of the decisions that the NPA has taken in the cases 
outlined in the previous chapter. 
 
2.  Distinguishing the judicial and the prosecutorial function 
 
It is clear that the decision to prosecute a matter does not pose a problem because 
whether a conviction is obtained depends, in the final analysis, on the judiciary; in 
theory, even a malicious prosecution will not succeed if the judiciary finds there is not 
enough evidence to prove the charge. It is however, a decision not to prosecute 
which is more problematic because there is no input into the outcome of such a 
decision from another branch of government.3 In theory, the failure on the part of the 
                                                          
1 Redpath (2012:70).  
2 Redpath (2012:70).  
3 Redpath (2012:41-42).  
 
 
 
 
91 
 
prosecution to carry out its obligations, in particular, by declining to pursue 
allegations of wrong-doing by members of the executive, leaves the NPA in this case 
no other choice but to have recourse to Parliament, to which it is accountable.4 
Parliament can therefore call the prosecution to account for the decisions it takes, 
particularly decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute. Although this is theoretically 
possible, an academic paper has argued that in a political systems where the 
president is elected by the legislature and therefore by the majority party in 
Parliament, the probability of Parliament calling the prosecution to account for its 
failure to prosecute is low.5 This study appears to hold true in South Africa, where 
the majority party in Parliament effectively elects the president. The South African 
Parliament has yet to call the NDPP to account for his failure to prosecute on any 
matter, including the arms deal matter and the then deputy president’s role in that 
matter.6 An example confirming the study referred to above is the way Parliament 
handled the termination of Pikoli’s tenure as the NDPP. Despite the fact that the 
Ginwala Commission Report found him to be fit and proper to hold the office of the 
NDPP and recommended his reinstatement, characteristically of a Parliament 
dominated by one (ruling) party, Parliament ratified Acting President Motlanthe’s 
decision not to reinstate him. 
 
The same applied with the National Council of Provinces, one of the important 
institutions of Parliament, in the decision-making process of this matter. And as Pikoli 
himself put it: 
                                                          
4 Redpath (2012:71).  
5 Redpath (2012:71).  
6 Redpath (2012:71).  
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I was under no illusion that this was anything other than the rubber-stamping of the 
executive decision in Parliament. They didn’t really consider the points I had put 
forward, and that even Ginwala herself had recommended that I be reinstated. The 
process made a mockery of the role of Parliament in terms of the executive truly 
being held accountable.7  
 
It is flagrant failures like these by Parliament to carry out its constitutional duties 
honestly that often see the judiciary doing the executive’s work or forcing Parliament 
to do its own work. This, therefore, creates an untenable situation in which the 
parameters of the doctrine of the separation of powers are enmeshed and which 
cause the tension that currently exists in SA between two of the three arms of 
government – the judiciary and the legislature. 
 
The Constitution and the Act do not only provide for the independence of the NPA 
against political interference, but they also provide safeguards to protect it. These 
laws do this by prohibiting and criminalising any interference in the prosecutorial 
decision-making process of the NPA by any person, politicians and government 
officials alike.8 Frank Chikane, the former Director General and Cabinet Secretary 
during Mbeki’s term of office as president, revealed that there was a group of people 
that was ‘constituted with the mandate to make the Zuma case goes away.’9 This 
group that was led by former Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and current 
Minister of Public Service and Administration, Lindiwe Sisulu, and included ‘a brains 
trust’10 of three intellectuals, namely, the former judge Willem Heath, the president of 
the South African Institute of Race Relations, Professor Sipho Seepe, and University 
                                                          
7  Pikoli and Wiener (2013:133). 
8  Sec 32(1)(b) of the NPA Act. 
9  See Chikane (2011:129) (own emphasis).  
10 A Basson Zuma Exposed, (Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg/Cape Town 2012) 71. 
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of Cape Town deputy registrar of legal services, Paul Ngobeni.11 The other key 
members heavily involved were Matthews Phosa, the former ANC treasury, and 
Motlanthe the then deputy president of both the ANC and the country.12 
 
This revelation by Chikane, who is also a senior member of the ANC, further gives 
credibility to the allegations that the NPA decision to drop the charges against Zuma 
was not taken independently and, most importantly, that the NPA was indeed 
manipulated by the executive and politicians for political ends. As earlier stated, 
unlike former President Mbeki, Zuma has not issued any firm and formal statement 
refuting these inferences and neither has Minister Sisulu and the other people who 
were allegedly involved in this illegal act. This clearly constitutes an institutionalised 
form of political interference in the prosecutorial independence of the NPA by both 
the government and the ruling party. History has shown that a single incident-setting 
precedent might soon start to snowball13 and spiral out of control. This stratagem is, 
therefore, likely to be adopted anytime a high profile politician or politically-connected 
person stands to be prosecuted by the NPA.  
 
It is also alleged that state institutions were used to influence the NPA decision in 
favour of Zuma. These institutions include primarily the National Intelligence Agency 
(NIA), the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the NPA itself.14 This they did, 
                                                          
11 Rossouw,  Brümmer, and Alcock,  `Triple play to save Zuma’ available at  
     Zumahttp://mg.co.za/printformat/single/2008-07-11-triple-play-to-save-zuma/ (accessed 25 April   
     2012) (hereafter Rossouw et al 2008).  
12  Rossouw et al (2008).  
13  Wolf (2011:88). 
14  Institute for Security Studies (20 March 2012) available at  
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inter alia, by spying on prosecutors, which illegal activity produced the spy tapes that 
the then Acting NDPP, Mpshe, used to drop the charges against Zuma.’15 From 
within the NPA, Willie Hofmeyr was the ruling party’s key contact person and chief 
advocate for the dropping of charges against Zuma.16 Hofmeyr happens to be one of 
the prosecutors with close historical links to the ruling party. The ANC’s special 
committee engaged Hofmeyr in negotiations to find a political solution to save Zuma 
from his legal woes.17 It is not surprising therefore that in the DA court challenge of 
the Mpshe decision. Hofmeyr authored an affidavit, the broader implication of which 
is a strong confirmation that the NPA’s decisions are not always independent.18 It is 
on the basis of these and other related revelations that it is believed today that 
Mpshe’s decision was equally not free from political manipulation; this time from the 
politicians and government officials associated with and led by Zuma himself.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
     http://www.polity.org.za/article/why-a-south-african-anti-corruption-agency-must-be-independent-   
    of-the-police-to-be-effective-2012-05-03 (accessed 17 April 2012). M Mkhabela  `Time to Undo    
     Leadership’ available at   
http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/columnists/2012/04/11/time-to-undo-leadership (accessed 17 April   
     2012).  
15   An unidentified spy then secretly passed on recordings of telephone conversations between   
     Ngcuka and Scorpion’s head Leonard McCarthy, which were bugged during 2007, to Zuma’s legal  
     counsel. The contents of the conversations centered on the timing of Zuma’s trial. Mpshe and  
     Hofmeyr then construed the (illegally?) bugged conversations as an abuse of power to justify the   
     dropping of charges against Zuma.  
16  Wolf (2011:64). 
17  Wolf (2011:64). See also The man behind the Zuma deal’ Cape Argus (2009-3-20); 'The high  
     price of political solutions’ Mail & Guardian 27 April 2009.   
18  Legal brief ` Details of NPA abuse revealed’ available at legalbrief.co.za/diary/legalbrief-    
     today/story/details-of-abuse-of.../pdf/ (accessed 9 October 2015). 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
Failure by the NPA to investigate these matters and to prosecute the culprits renders 
the independence of prosecution service in particular, a fiction.   
 
3.  Aspects of the political background to the NPA’s decision-making process 
 
The NPA’s code of ethics provides that ‘[i]n the institution of criminal proceedings, 
the prosecutor will proceed only when a case is well-founded upon evidence 
reasonably believed to be reliable and admissible, and will not continue with a 
prosecution in the absence of such evidence.’19 This is, inter alia, the policy basis 
that the NPA uses to select which cases to prosecute and not to prosecute. This 
basis is founded on the prosecutor’s independent prosecutorial decision-making 
function as contemplated in the Constitution and the Act. The selection of cases on 
the basis of the reasons advanced in the policy is neither illegal nor wrong.  In 
Mohunram v National Director of Public Prosecutions & Another (Law Review Project 
as Amicus Curiae) Sachs J, writing for the majority, stated in the context of the 
forfeiture of assets involved in organized crime as follows: 
 
`If [the Asset Forfeiture Unit] is to accomplish the important functions attributed to it, it 
should not unduly disperse the resources it has at its command. Its manifest function as 
defined by statute is to serve as a strongly empowered law enforcement agency going 
after powerful crooks and their multitude of covert or overt subalterns. The danger exists 
that if the AFU spreads its net too widely so as to catch the small fry, it will make it easier 
for the big fish and their surrounding shoal of predators to elude the law. This would 
frustrate rather than further the objectives of POCA.’
20  
 
This approach applies similarly to the NPA’s discretion to select which cases to 
investigate and prosecute and which one not to pursue. If the NDPP were to 
                                                          
19 A Practical Guide to the Ethical Code of Conduct for Members of the NPA (2004:19). 
20 H Woolaver and M Bishop `Submission to Ginwala Enquiry’ at 14. 
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prosecute every person whom he/she suspects of being involved in organised crime 
or breaking the law, The NPA would not have the resources to prosecute the people 
at the top of the organised crime pyramid.21  
 
Then there is the case of Zuma’s personal lawyer and official legal advisor, Michael 
Hully. Hully is deeply trapped in the spy tapes saga for having been illegally in 
possession of these illegally acquired tapes. The NPA has openly stated that the 
records required for handover to the DA are in Hully’s possession and until he 
consents to release them the NPA’s hands are tied. This is in direct contempt of the 
SCA judgment that ordered that these records be handed over to the DA. Again, the 
NPA has neither intention nor appetite to investigate and prosecute this matter.  And 
there is no doubt that this is because, by being Zuma’s lawyer, Hulley is 
untouchable. This is yet another proof that the NPA is operating with fear, favour and 
prejudice based on political consideration and partisanship.  
 
The NPA has also failed to investigate other allegations of corruption against other 
high profile politicians, including former President Mbeki, who is alleged to have 
solicited arms deal bribes to pay for the ANC 1999 election campaign.22  Chippy 
Shaik, brother to Zuma’s former financial advisor, Shabir Shaik, who was fingered in 
                                                          
21 H Woolaver and M Bishop `Submission to Ginwala Enquiry’ at 14. 
22 `The Arms Deal Special Report’ Mail & Guardian available at http://mg.co.za/report/the-arms-deal 
(accessed 24 November 2012). See News24 `Articles relating to the arms deal’ available at 
http://www.news24.com/Tags/Topics/arms_deal (accessed 20 January 2010) and Corruption 
Watch `The arms deal: what you need to know’ available at 
http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/content/arms-deal-what-you-need-know (accessed 24 
November 2012).  
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the JIT (Joint Investigative Team) report and is widely believed to have benefited 
unlawfully from the arms deal was also not pursued.23 Allegations of corruption 
against other high ranking ANC leaders were never pursued or were dropped by the 
NPA for reasons that seem unclear.24 All these selective prosecution practices erode 
the trust that the public in general had on the NPA as an independent prosecution 
agency. Despite the fact that there is no hard evidence to prove the alleged abuse of 
power by the NPA, there is abundance of compelling circumstantial evidence to 
suggest that there is political interference in the NPA.  
 
This study has already identified and discussed a number of controversial decisions 
taken by the NPA which clearly suggest political considerations and bias in favour of 
the government and politicians linked to the ruling party.   
 
4.  Public interest v interests of justice 
 
It is undeniable that the balancing process of the public interests with the interests of 
justice is a delicate and complex one. However, it is one of the fundamental 
principles that the NPA, as lynchpin of SA’s criminal justice system, has to take into 
serious cognisance when performing its prosecutorial function. In line with the 
enhancement of the protection for prosecutorial independence, the NPA Act in 
section 22 (4) (f), requires the NDPP to bring the United Nations Guidelines on the 
Role of the Prosecutors to the attention of all prosecutors and to ‘promote their 
                                                          
23 `The Arms Deal Special Report’.  
24 `The Arms Deal Special Report’. 
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respect for and compliance with (the Guidelines) within the framework of national 
legislation.’25 These Guidelines mandate that: 
 
`In the performance of their duties, prosecutors shall …[p]rotect the public interest, act 
with objectivity, take proper account of the position of the suspect and the victim and 
pay attention to all relevant circumstances, irrespective of whether they are to the 
advantage or disadvantage of the suspect….’ 
 
 
Relying, inter alia, on this provision, Ackermann and Goldstone JJ stated in 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre G for Applied 
Legal Studies Intervening), that  ‘prosecutors have always owed a duty to carry out 
their public functions independently and in the interests of the public.’26 In R v Riekert 
the Court stated that the prosecutor’s role is wider than that of defence counsel, for 
the prosecutor represents the state. The Court went on to say that the criminal law of 
the land should, subject to immunity or exemption sanctioned by law, apply to all 
alike, for the `maintenance of public confidence in the administration of justice 
requires that it be, and be seen to be even handed.’27 
 
5.  Prosecutions in adversarial and inquisitorial criminal justice systems 
 
There are two basic systems of justice that are particularly relevant in the analysis of 
the independence or lack thereof of the NPA. These are the adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems. The former is also referred to as the accusatorial or the 
                                                          
25  Sec 22 (4) (f) of the NPA Act.  
26 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre G for Applied Legal Studies  
    Intervening) 6. 2002 (1) SACR 79 (CC) at para 72 at 105 d-e. 
27 Pikoli v President of the Republic and Others CASE NO: 8550/09 (11/08/2009) available at     
    http://www.saflii.org.za (accessed 1 January 2012). 
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common law system, while the latter is also known as the continental or the civil law 
system.  The goal of both the adversarial system and the inquisitorial system is to 
find the truth. However, they differ in terms of the procedural approaches. In the 
adversarial system the court depends largely on the two parties – the prosecutor for 
the state and the defence lawyer for the accused (the adversaries) – to help it find 
establish the truth.28  The prosecutor and the defence each present the facts as they 
see them and their theories of the case. Both sides are allowed to present evidence 
and witnesses to support their positions. The opposing side can cross examine 
witnesses, analyze the evidence independently, and challenge arguments made 
before the court. The goal of this process is to present all of the facts of the case for 
the benefit of the judge or jury, who can sift through the material to decide what 
happened and who, if anyone, should be held responsible. The neutral judge then 
weighs the arguments and produces a verdict or judgment, hence the term ‘blind 
justice.’ Not blind to the facts but blind to the wealth, colour, religion etc. of the 
parties, particularly, the accused.29 In this approach in criminal matters, the accused 
is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the burden of proving guilt rests with 
the prosecution. 
 
In the inquisitorial system, the presiding judge is not a passive recipient of 
information but rather active in supervising the process of gathering evidence 
necessary to resolve the case. The judge actively steers the search for evidence and 
                                                          
28 A body of people sworn to give a true verdict according to the evidence presented in the court of   
    law found at   http://www.definitions.net/definition/jury (accessed 3 September 2013). 
29 What is the difference between adversarial system and inquisitorial system? Found at  
    http://www.answers.com/topic/adversarial (accessed 2 July 2013). 
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questions the witnesses, including the accused. The prosecution and defence 
lawyers play a more passive role, suggesting routes of inquiry for the presiding judge 
and following the judge's questioning with questioning of their own. The prosecution 
and the defence lawyers’ questioning is often brief because the judge tries to ask all 
relevant questions. All parties, including the accused, are expected (but not required) 
to cooperate in the investigation by answering the magistrate's questions and 
supplying relevant evidence.30  
 
The South African criminal justice system is based on adversarial approach. 
However, the way in which the NPA’s now defunct Directorate of Special Operation 
(DSO) was designed to deal with criminal cases was such that it blurs the lines 
between the adversarial and inquisitorial systems. This is so because, the DSO’s 
integrated investigative approach is such that investigators, analysts and prosecutors 
work close together right from the initiation of the investigation and throughout the 
trial. This approach, in which prosecutors, in particular, are intrinsically involved in 
the initiation of the case, investigation and ultimately its prosecution, has been 
criticised for harming the prosecutorial integrity and for breaching the constitutional 
rights of the accused.31 This is confirmed by Montesh who, referring to it as a troika 
system, states that: 
 
`The use of a troika system by the DSO where the investigator sits with the prosecutor 
and the intelligent / analyst right from the beginning of the investigation puts them in an 
advantageous position. This means that the prosecutor has inside knowledge of the 
                                                          
30 Trial systems, The Royal Court of Justice available at  
    http://www.judiciary.gov.bt/html/court/trial.php. (accessed 2 July 2013). 
31 G  Wannenburg (ed) “Putting Paid to the Untouchables? The Effects of Dissolving the Directorate 
of Special Operations and Specialised Commercial Crime Units’ in (2008) 24 SA Crime Quarterly.  
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case, making it easy to secure a conviction; hence the so-called high conviction rate is 
achieved.’
32   
 
Zuma and one of his staunch supporters throughout his botched corruption cases, in 
particular, Moe Shaik, have been very critical of the DSO approach. Zuma 
consistently argued that this integrated approach creates a loophole through which 
politically-driven charges against him were enforced by his detractors. This, 
according to him, unnecessarily impaired his integrity and breached his constitutional 
rights. Shaik argued that this approach goes against the South African legal system 
which is adversarial in nature. He argued, in effect, that the DSO’s approach, on the 
contrary, is bending towards inquisitorial approach - a legal system ‘where the court 
or a part of the court is actively involved in investigating the facts of the case, as 
opposed to an adversarial system where the role of the court is primarily that of an 
impartial referee between the prosecution and the defence.’33 Zuma claimed that in 
his case, the prosecutor played the role of both the investigator and prosecutor – 
which made him privy to the dossier prior the trial giving him an unfair advantage 
over his (Zuma) defence lawyers.  
 
While these are valid concerns, at least in theory, there is no evidence that suggests 
that the NPA, through the DSO had, in any way, provided space for Zuma’s political 
enemies to fabricate either the corruption charges or any other case he faced in 
                                                          
32 M Montesh A Critical Analysis of Crime Investigative System within the South African Justice 
System: A Comparative Study, University of South Africa. November 2007, at 11. 
33 See Inquisitorial system available at http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Inquisitional+system (accessed 2 July 2013); D Jackson 
Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice Medico-Legal Society of NSW Inc. Scientific 
Meeting - March 2009 available at http://www.sputtr.com/inquisitorial (accessed 26 July 2011). 
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recent past. Nor is there case law that suggests that charges against Zuma or 
anyone originated as a result of the investigators, analysts and prosecutors working 
closely together in investigating matters. Even when prosecutors are involved in 
directing the investigations, the parties being investigated are still guaranteed fair 
and ‘blind justice’ in the sense that, first, such a case is still subject to be presented 
before an independent magistrate or judge. Secondly, the defence would still have 
an opportunity to rebuff the state’s case. Thirdly, if there is no truth in the state’s 
case, the independent magistrate or judge will certainly rule in favour of the defence.  
As stated by the SCA in the National Director of Public Prosecution and Zuma that 
‘[a] prosecution is not wrongful merely because it is brought for an improper purpose. 
It will only be wrongful if, in addition, reasonable and probable grounds for 
prosecuting are absent…’34 Based on this analogy and SCA ruling, the complaint 
about the DSO approach above falls away.  
 
The only logical reason one can deduce from these complaint against the DSO’s 
investigative approach is that it strengthened the state’s chances of a successful 
prosecution that meets the threshold of `beyond reasonable doubt.. And this it does 
by eliminating the loopholes that criminals have so far used to get off the hook that 
range from lack of evidence to prove their guilt to the  procedural and technical 
mistakes made during the investigations by police in general due to lack of 
experience and how the courts operate.  And indeed, the real concern behind 
Zuma’s claim that, in his case, the prosecutor played the role of both the investigator 
and prosecutor, is clearly not that any of his constitutional rights have been violated, 
but rather that the state happened to have discovered and known if at all he was 
                                                          
34 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma (573/08) [2009] ZASCA 1 (12 Jan 2009) para 37. 
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involved in the alleged crimes for which he was charged. This view is supported by 
Pikoli’s observation that when the DSO was arresting and prosecuting the ‘small-
time crooks’ the chief critics of the Scorpions did not complain. But when politicians 
became targets also and felt the heat, they went like ‘Aah, now this is beginning to 
involve us’ and  they ‘suddenly became vocal about the Scorpions’ style of 
operations and that they were picking and choosing only the cases they believed 
would earn good press coverage and that (Scorpions) members were being trained 
by international agencies.’35     
 
Judge Khampepe, who was appointed by former President Mbeki to head the 
Commission that investigated this matter, found that there was nothing wrong with 
the DSO’s approach. Judge Khampepe concluded thus:   
 
I am satisfied that the practice of housing multiple disciplines under one command 
structure is sound practice. The structure of the DSO in this regard, enhances a closer 
co-operation amongst the various disciplines. The one discipline benefits from the 
expertise of the other, making the cross-pollination an effective strategy in combating 
crime and ensures a return of higher conviction ratios.36 
 
The truth of the matter is that, while accusatorial and inquisitorial systems differ, they 
are slowly converging, although they are never likely to be exactly the same.37  
According to Jackson, ‘the differences between is essentially the role of the judge in 
the pre-trial phase in which, in the inquisitorial system, he is able to direct the 
obtaining of evidence  and the stage of the proceedings at which the evidence is 
                                                          
35 Pikoli and Wiener (2013:130-131). 
36 Khampepe Commission Report, February 2006 para 155. 
37 Jackson 2009). See also Justice Mogoro, Fifth Interim Report on Simplification of Criminal  
    Procedure, Project 73, the South African Law Commission, August 2002. 
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taken. In Jacksons view, nations may have different views on this matter, and as 
there is no absolute rule, nations are entitled to decide their own ways of arriving at a 
just result.’38 And as judge Khampepe puts it, the DSO’s investigative approach of 
teaming up investigators, analysts and prosecutors together is a ‘sound practice’ of 
combating crime that ‘ensures a return of higher conviction ratios.’39  
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
 
There is no escaping the fact that the NPA has become embroiled in politics – 
precisely what the drafters of the Constitution sought to avoid. More than this, 
personal and party political interests have come to bedevil the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion at the highest level where the course of justice threatens to 
have an adverse outcome for persons in high office and those aligned or connected 
with the private interest of the President. The vulgarity and impunity with which 
constitutional and statutory principles are thrown overboard for the sake of pandering 
to political whims is an inexpressibly unfortunate, for it is destined to subvert the rule 
of law completely. Fortunately, we are reminded continuingly by the courts, writers 
and commentators that constitutional tenets underpinning the office of the NDPP and 
the NPA in general are cornerstones of a constitutional state built on the rule of law. 
It is therefore important to continue to be vigilant and critical of abuse of office, even 
when the abuse threatens to be a matter that is taken for granted. 
                                                          
38 Jackson (2009). 
39 Khampepe Commission Report, February 2006, para 155. 
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                                                      CHAPTER 6 
 
 
                                    Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
It is my observation that the independence of the NPA is important in the proper 
functioning of the judiciary and maintenance of the rule of law. This thesis has traced 
the history of the prosecution service from the beginning of statehood in South Africa 
in the mid-17th Century to the present. The study has focused mainly on examining 
the relationship between the prosecution service and the executive arm of 
government. 
 
2.  NPA independence – a fiction 
 
There is no hard case-law evidence to date to corroborate the claim that the NPA is 
not as independent as contemplated in the Constitution and the NPA Act. However, 
the events chronicled in this thesis show that, at the behest of mainly President 
Zuma, the integrity of the prosecutorial discretion of the NPA has taken a severe 
knocking political considerations have on several occasions influenced the NDPPs 
decision-making at the expense of the interests of justice. Circumstances 
surrounding the charging, prosecution and withdrawal of charges against President 
Zuma, and the NPA’s role in blocking the handing over of the spy tapes to the 
Democratic Alliance, in contempt of court orders has, in the main, elucidated this 
regretful state of affairs about one of the most important agencies of the South 
African criminal justice system.  
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It also does not require case law evidence to agree with the observation that the rule 
of law has been compromised and that the general public has lost trust on the NPA, 
government’s seriousness about the fight against crime and corruption. And in any 
situation where rule of law is eroded and anarchy prevails, the economy collapses 
and so do institutions of state. It is therefore important that integrity be restored to 
the administration of criminal justice.  
 
3.  Lack of political will 
 
There is clearly a dearth lack of political and executive will to allow the NPA to 
function without interference. This is clearly signified by the continued failure by the 
ANC-led government to comply with the orders of the courts (Constitutional Court1 
and the Western Cape High Court, to ensure through amendment of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Amendment Bill of 2008 (NPAA Bill) (B23-2008), that the DPCI 
is adequately insulated from executive and political interference and manipulation to 
be able to carry out its function without fear or favour.    
 
The ruling party’s continuous overwhelming dominance in Parliament has had the 
effect of it dictating the political agenda and the priorities of government. Securing 
the independence of the prosecution service is not regarded as a priority. It is 
therefore up to civil society to bring pressure on the government to ensure the 
integrity of the administration of justice. Fortunately, South Africa has a vibrant and 
                                                          
1 Hugh Glenister v the President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 48/10) [2011] 
ZACC 6 (17 March 2011) and Helen Suzman Foundation v the President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others CASE NO: 23874/2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
107 
 
resilient civil society which has shown itself very able to galvanise public opinion and 
force government to address issues of concern to society, for example HIV/AIDS and 
the provision of municipality services.  
 
4.  Recommendations  
 
It is recommended that the following measures be introduced to strengthen the 
independence of the NPA: 
(a) The NPA needs to be modeled along the lines of Chapter 9 Institutions. More 
precisely, its independence from political interference needs to be written into 
the law. The fact that outside interference in the exercise of discretion by the 
NPA is punishable under the existing law has not prevented political 
interference to take place with impunity. A legally, proactive safeguarding of 
the NPA would entrench its functional independence more boldly and deter 
interference by the executive with its workings, especially the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. However, the Chapter 9 Institutions are not 
necessarily wholly insulated against political interference, for the existence of 
a one-party dominant political system that has characterised South Africa 
before and after 1994, has proved that the President may still appoint to a key 
position someone who is likely to further the interests of the ruling elite’s 
political agenda.  But so far, it has been easier to manipulate the NPA than 
some of the key Chapter 9 Institutions, such as the Office of the Public 
Protector.     
 
(b) What has contributed partly to rendering the NPA vulnerable to political 
caprices is the absence of the word ‘independent’ in the constitutional and 
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statutory clauses that create the NPA. The word ‘independence’ must be 
included in section 179 of the Constitution and in the NPA Act as well. This, 
however, will serve only to guarantee the NPA of independence but not to 
safeguard the same against unscrupulous NDPPs, members of the executive 
and politicians.    
 
(c) To forestall the possibility of circumventing the constitutional and statutory 
imperative of ‘independence’ by appointing submissive party adherents to 
positions that require the genuine exercise of independent discretion, the 
power to recommend potential appointees to the positions of NDPP, DPPs 
and Special Prosecutors must be vested with the JSC. Just like in the case of 
the Chapter 9 Institutions, the author is aware that the JSC is not immune to 
leaning towards the executive and acting in the manner that seem to advance 
political causes rather than the interest of the public. But a JSC-approved 
appointee to a key position in the NPA would be more credible than the 
present system of appointment allows. Besides, the appointee would be more 
in the public eye than is the case at the moment where appointments are 
made quietly and out of the public glare. This transparency would require the 
appointee to be more accountable for his or her decisions.    
 
(d)  The role of the Minister of Justice must be limited to policy-making only to 
ensure it is in line with the government’s priorities and objectives but not in 
overseeing the implementation of the same. That must be the responsibility of 
the Office of the Chief Justice to whom the NDPP must account on 
prosecutorial matters. The budget of the NPA must also be allocated by the 
Office of the Chief Justice as opposed to the Ministry of Justice and 
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Correctional Services (formerly Ministry of Justice and Constitutional 
Development) as it is the case now.  
 
The importance of an independent judiciary including an independent prosecuting 
authority cannot be over-emphasised.2 As Atkin in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 
206 at 244 correctly said:  ‘[A]mid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They 
may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace….[J]udges 
are no respecters of persons and stand between the subject and any attempted 
encroachments on his liberty by the executive, alert to see that any coercive action is 
justified in law.’3  
 
To achieve this, the rule of law must be observed and this cannot be possible where 
there is no accountability by the government, state institutions and public officials. 
This is confirmed by Nasva J in the Democratic Alliance v The President of the RSA 
& Others that to ‘ensure a functional, accountable constitutional democracy the 
drafters of our Constitution placed limits on the exercise of power. Institutions and 
office bearers must work within the law and must be accountable. Put simply, ours is 
a government of laws and not of men or women.’4 As discussed above, the 
government (President, Cabinet and Parliament and relevant state institutions and 
office bearers) have, in relation to the functioning of the NPA, since its inception to 
date, failed to be responsible and accountable for, inter alia, not having observed the 
requirements and limitations of their powers. And if the Constitution and the NPA Act 
                                                          
2 M Luphondo (2011:22). 
3 Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 at 244. 
4 DA v President of South Africa (263/11)[2011] ZASCA 241 (1 December 2011) para 66. 
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are not amended as suggested above, the NPA will continue to be exposed to 
political interference regardless under which government.  
 
Finally, it is worth quoting Tumwine, who said that any ‘democracy will fail if its 
functionaries cannot distinguish or respect the difference between party and state. 
The recent unfortunate history of the prosecution services as outlined here could be 
indicative of a situation that may slide into anarchy / or a repressive regime that 
could set the country back for many years or ripen it for serious upheaval and civil 
disorder. Such are the unavoidable wages of failure to develop and maintain a well-
functioning institutional framework.’5 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 W Tumwine The role of public opinion in court decisions on the legality of the death penalty: a look 
  at Uganda and South Africa (unpublished LLM dissertation, University of Ghana, Legon 2006) at 65.  
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